

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
2	AT KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE
3)
4	SNMP RESEARCH, INC. and SNMP) RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, INC.,)
5	Plaintiffs,)
6	vs.) Case No. 3:20-cv-451
7	BROADCOM, INC., BROCADE) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, LLC,)
8	and EXTREME NETWORKS,
9	Defendants.)
10	
11	MOTION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEBRA C. POPLIN
	DEFORE THE HONORABLE DEBRA C. POPULA
12	Friday, March 25, 2022 10:07 a.m. to 3:17 p.m.
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One Manhattan West New York, NY 10001-8602 Defendant: Extreme Networks, Inc.		
ALISON PLESSMAN, ESQ. SALVATORE UMBERTO BONACCORSO, ESQ. (appeared telephonically) HUESTON HENNIGAN, LLP 523 West 6th Street Suite 400 Los Angeles, CA 90014 Defendants: Broadcom, Inc. and Brocade Communications Systems, LLC JOHN NEUKOM, ESQ. DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, LLP 650 California Street San Francisco, CA 94108 and LESLIE A. DEMERS, ESQ. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP One Manhattan West New York, NY 10001-8602 Defendant: Extreme Networks, Inc. ALSO PRESENT: PHILLIP BLUM, ESQ., Corporate Counsel for Broadcom, Inc. ********* ********* ********* *****	1	APPEARANCES: (Continued)
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1 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 2 The United States District Court for the 3 Eastern District of Tennessee is now open pursuant to 4 adjournment with the Honorable Debra C. Poplin, United 5 States Magistrate Judge, presiding. Please come to order and be seated. 6 7 We are here for a motion hearing in Case 3:20-cv-451. 8 9 Here on behalf of the plaintiffs are Alvin 10 Matthew Ashley, Olivia Weber, John Wood, and Cheryl 11 Rice. 12 Are the plaintiffs ready to proceed? MS. RICE: Yes, Your Honor. 13 14 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: And here on behalf of 15 the defendants are John Neukom, Leslie -- is it Demers? 16 MS. DEMERS: Yes. 17 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: -- Alison Plessman, 18 Phillip Blum, and on the telephone is Salvatore 19 Bonaccorso. 20 Are the defendants ready to proceed? MR. NEUKOM: Yes, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. Let me ask --23 Ms. Rice. It's fine. Take the podium. 24 Will there be primary counsel for argument, or 25 is it going to be handled in some other fashion?

1 MS. RICE: Well, Your Honor, good morning. May 2 it please the Court, happy to be here today on behalf of 3 the plaintiffs. 4 Yes, Mr. Matt Ashley will be taking the 5 leadoff. However, we probably will be sharing the 6 arguments --7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MS. RICE: -- as we move along. 9 So I would like to take the opportunity, very briefly, Your Honor, to introduce Matt Ashley and Olivia 10 11 Weber, both members of the California Bar who have been 12 admitted pro hac vice in this matter. This is their 13 first appearance before the Court. 14 THE COURT: Welcome to the district. 15 MS. RICE: And then, of course, Dr. Jeffrey 16 Case, who is the founder and chief officer of the 17 plaintiffs, SNMP Research and SNMP Research 18 International. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MS. RICE: I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Ashley. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. ASHLEY: Thank you. 24 Good morning, Your Honor. I thought that the 25 way, ultimately, we might handle this is: Instead of --

because of the volume of requests and the volume of objections and how they tend to repeat themselves, we could maybe handle it like we did in the briefing, like the parties did in the briefing, which is take it by -- issue by issue.

But before we dive into the issues -- and some are more pressing than others because of the time that we have left in this case. Particularly, in about four-and-a-half months, our opening expert -- plaintiffs' opening expert reports are due.

But before we get into those issues, I thought it might help you if I could give you a little bit of background about the case. It's in the briefing, too, to some extent.

THE COURT: And I have reviewed --

MR. ASHLEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- the Complaint and all of the briefings on the motion.

MR. ASHLEY: So, the plaintiffs, SNMP Research International and SNMP Research, Inc., they're Tennessee corporations. Their principal place of business is here in Knox County, and they are -- they were founded by Dr. Case and his wife, his late wife, and he is the owner and operator of them today; although, they do have employees.

SNMP takes its name from the protocol, Simple Network Management Protocol. And just at a very high level, a protocol is a way of communicating. So it's a language. And SNMP's protocol is directed at communicating with respect to the management of a network.

And maybe it would help you to have a little explanation of the products that are at issue in this case. You know, I'm going to be very generalized here, probably over-generalized, because it's not like we're doing a tech tutorial.

But the products at issue in this case are, by and large, what are called switches. And all a switch really is is: It's a product that allows you to plug in a whole bunch of electronic devices and then for there to be communications passed to and from and received and sent by these devices.

So, for, like, the Brocade products, the storage area network products, you could think of it as a way to interconnect a bunch of storage devices. Like, you might have hard drives and then allow multiple computers to be able to access those simultaneously.

And for Extreme, it's Ethernet switches. So it's a switch where you can have a bunch of computers hooked up and they can communicate with each other.

And what SNMP does, at, again, a very high level -- and this is not trying to be all-inclusive. But it really helps the network administrator set up that switch and monitor what's going on with that switch. So it's pretty critical.

Now, it's been around a long time. Dr. Case was instrumental in the development of the protocol, and, of course, then he developed his software which is an implementation of that protocol. It's in all sorts of products.

All sorts of companies, large and small, use Dr. Case's software, and a lot of the governmental entities do, too, and it's because it's very good, very proven, very reliable, and been around a long time.

And I'm going to talk about 20 years ago and get into the license at issue in this case, and that was in 2001, and Brocade obtained license rights to Dr. Case's software.

Now, those licenses, Dr. Case's licenses, have very restricted, detailed restrictions, on them. You can use them with certain platforms, certain processors. There is all sorts of limitations that I won't go into.

One of the key limitations, though, is that you can't transfer it. You can't assign it. Not without SNMP's express permission. And that includes -- an

assignment includes a merger. That's number one.

Number two, you cannot -- the Brocade license, you cannot disclose his source code to third parties.

So that contract was amended several times.

Again, I'm not going to get into one versus three versus five. Just understand it's been around a long, long time.

And now let's fast forward six years, 2017, and that's -- that's where this all starts. Kind of late 2016, Broadcom and Brocade announce they're going to merge -- and I could have the date a little off. And then around that same time when this merger is going to occur, they're going to spin off or divest a portion of Brocade's business to Extreme.

And the letter that kicks this off -- I think it would be helpful, Your Honor, if you have access to the Weber declarations in support of both motions. I'm mainly going to be working off of the Extreme one, but I'm going to start with the Broadcom/Brocade Motion to Compel.

And this document is under seal, so I'm not going to be verbatim through it, but I did want you to actually lay eyes on the document that sort of kicks this all off.

It's actually -- it's Exhibit A to the Weber

declaration. If it helps you, the Docket No. is 118. 2 And I can hand it up if you'd like. It's part of the 3 record. But if you have access, I won't. 4 THE COURT: I can just get this pulled up. 5 MR. ASHLEY: And other than this one, Your Honor, the other ones I'll be talking about, we can hand 6 7 out. We just happen to only have one copy of this one, 8 unfortunately. THE COURT: Oh, it's fine. It's just -- my 9 10 remote connection was not set up. It's taking just a 11 moment. 12 MR. ASHLEY: And if you can't find 118, you can 13 look at the public version at 116 dash -- Docket 116-2. 14 THE COURT: I've got 118. It's starting to 15 download. 16 All right. I'm with you. 17 MR. ASHLEY: You have it? 18 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 19 MR. ASHLEY: So it should -- to make sure that 20 we're looking at the same thing, at the top right corner, there is a big Brocade emblem, and it's dated 21 22 September 13, 2017. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. ASHLEY: Okay. So that's really what I 25 wanted to point you to. I won't go into the detail and

the substance, but this was a letter that was sent by Brocade, basically on behalf of Extreme, Brocade and Broadcom, and it's dated September 13th, 2017, and the subject line talks about what it is. And basically, in a nutshell, this was the -- essentially, like, a notice, but it asked Dr. Case's company to agree and accept that there was going to be a transfer.

It kind of roughly describes the transaction.

I think the transaction later changed a bit, in terms of the way it was done. But this is sort of the beginning of SNMP's notice that they were looking to do this.

And if you look to -- for instance, in the first sentence, you see these references to the word "affiliate." So SNMP's being told, hey, us an affiliate and them an affiliate, and there's these affiliates, and we're going to do something with your software.

And if you turn to page 3, there is -- it's already been pre-signed by Brocade and Extreme, and they're asking Dr. Case's company to acknowledge and agree to it.

And up at the top of the notice, the notice goes to Extreme and they go to Broadcom, Limited.

Broadcom, Limited is the predecessor to what is now Broadcom, Inc., which is one of the defendants, which will give you an indication of why Broadcom, Inc. -- one

of the reasons why Broadcom, Inc. is in this case and why we're inquiring into Broadcom, Inc. and affiliates.

And when Dr. Case received this, his attorney,
John Wood -- who is sitting right over there -- wrote
back -- this one is not in the record, but we can
provide it; I don't think any of this is in dispute -within a few weeks of this, wrote back to all of
Brocade, Extreme, and Broadcom and said, "No, we don't
consent. Not that we would never consent, but you can't
just send us a letter like this. We need to know more
about this transaction, what's going to happen with our
software," etcetera.

So, as it turns out, though, they just proceeded anyway with the transfer of SNMP's software to Extreme, and that included the source code.

What happened after that was: Six months later, Extreme -- after this transfer has already occurred, despite the lack of consent, Extreme reaches out to SNMP again. They don't write to John Wood.

If you -- the rest of these are not under seal. If you can pull up the Weber declaration in support of the Motion to Compel as to Extreme, I'm only going to look at a couple of these exhibits, but I did want to point out some key language to you.

Exhibit A is the second reach-out from Extreme

to SNMP. And I'll direct you -- this is an e-mail. So I'm going to start in the back, or approximately the back. If you look at page 9 of 11 -- if you're looking at the Docket 96-3, it would be 9 of 11. If you're looking at the Bates stamp, it would be SNMP 4570. That's where we'll start.

Are you there?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ASHLEY: So, if you look, there is an e-mail dated Monday, the 16th of April 2016, from someone named Jennifer Sipes at Extreme to Steve Blizzard, who is an officer at SNMP, and they -- and they say -- and I'm just going to jump to the pertinent paragraph. It's the third paragraph.

"In connection with and prior to the acquisition, you were forwarded the attached assignment notice in September 2017." That's what we just looked at. "Unfortunately we have not heard back from you to date." That is not true. "In order for Extreme to be assured of your understanding of the current arrangement, would you please take a moment and sign the attached." It goes on.

And if you flip backward a page, you see the response that they get. It's from John Wood. And John writes near the bottom, "Jennifer, I am counsel for SNMP

Research, and I did respond to your assignment notice shortly after you sent it in September. I have attached that correspondence. The license between Brocade and SNMP Research is not assignable without SNMP's consent, and SNMP Research has not provided that consent. If Extreme is using or distributing SNMP Research software it obtained from Brocade, then it is doing so out of license."

And he said, "I'd be glad to have a call and you give me more information about how it's being done and we can talk about an assignment."

Then she responds about a week later. And, again, I'm going to jump to the main point. Second sentence, "As discussed, below is a Brocade product list with SNMP Research software." And she lists VDX 8770 Series. These are a series of products. It's a product line. No trouble finding that out.

And these discussions progressed. Mr. Wood kept trying to find out more and more. You know, after he gets the names, he wants to know things like quantities.

So, for instance, if you go to Exhibit B -- or in addition, Your Honor, another key issue he was looking into was there a transfer of the Brocade product line that was in the data center business to Extreme.

And so they just -- they're still selling those.

But we also come to learn that they created their own products with that software. And what that means is: The reason why you give source code to a company like a Brocade or an Extreme is they're not just receiving, like, the working program like you would in -- you know, imbedded in a computer; they're getting the source code so they can work it in with their code and put it into their product to have a working product. So we come to find that Extreme has new products.

And if you look at Exhibit B -- I'm just going to take you to the first page. The very bottom,

Mr. Wood writes, "Can you let me know the Extreme products that are using SNMP software without a license."

So you hear sometimes in this case, "We just don't know" -- because, for instance, Brocade has a different license with SNMP, one, maybe two, that are not at issue in this case, and Extreme had one a long time ago and products basically ran out.

But we asked, "Which ones are you using without a license?" They responded.

Now, Exhibit C is under seal, but you can flip to it. And I won't go into the detail, but you can just kind of look at this and you'll see what John Wood is

trying to do is: "Tell me how much. What shipped when? Tell me for 2017. Tell me for 2018. Tell me for 2019." And they did, down to SKU numbers. "You're using our software without a license. Which ones?"

Now, Extreme knows this. So there is no doubt that Brocade knows it. Extreme got the stuff from Brocade.

But when you -- as we're finding this out, we send a notice of breach to Brocade. John Wood sends that, but says, "You can try and cure it."

I should note one more thing: During these discussions with Extreme, it became clear that what had happened, it was not a transfer. It wasn't like Brocade just transferred the rights to Extreme and then just washed their hands of it. They transferred the source code, which Extreme is using and making new products with. But Brocade is still doing it, too. So they're both using it now. So they're in breach. Brocade is in breach and Extreme is selling without a license.

And I realize these are all allegations. I haven't proven any of this. I'm just walking you through what our allegations are so you have the scope of the case, so you know what's relevant and what's not relevant.

So John Wood sends a notice of breach. They

don't respond and say, "No, we didn't breach." He gives them an opportunity to cure and they don't. So he terminates not the -- not the agreement itself, but their use and distribution rights, redistribution rights, Brocade's, under the contract.

They were in breach long before that, but now it's like you don't -- now, just to make it really clear, your use and distribution rights are gone.

And after that Brocade is trying to get a license. And I won't go through the same type of rigmarole, but they have the same sort of conversation. And then Brocade is asked, "What are you using? Because to know what" -- "to know what we should do, we need to know what you did."

And they also provide a list of the products that Brocade is using SNMP software without a license, and that is the Weber declaration, Exhibit B. It's under seal, but if you look at page 26, it's 166-3 at 26. You can look. Here they are.

So, with that background in mind -- and before I get into the issues, let me just tell you what we want generally. What all this discovery is directed at -- because it looks like a lot, but it's -- actually, if you just -- if you understand what you have to prove in a case like this, it becomes readily apparent that what

we're asking for is relevant.

The question becomes: Is it burdensome? Is there privilege issues here? Is it burdensome? And have they met their burden to show it's burdensome? Very sophisticated in that they can do searches and things like that.

So, with all that in mind, with respect to liability -- and I'm going to focus -- I'm going to put aside the breach of contract claim for now. I'm not going to -- I'm just going to talk about copyright infringement.

With respect to the liability portion of the case, we have to show copying. And not identical copying, copying. We're going to have to show code and say that didn't happen by accident. And it's got to be substantially similar. And we have to show they had access. The access is not going to be difficult in this case.

Yeah, their admissions are great. The preceded admissions are great. That's why we essentially used -- that's what we used in the Complaint for the actual products that we called accused products in the Complaint.

But make no mistake, the allegation is copyright infringement. You're infringing our

copyrights. And you don't have to know all the products. You're supposed to look and tell us the products under oath which ones. You know how to do it. You did it before the case; you can do it again.

And you don't get to direct how we define our terms. They can -- they can serve discovery on us with their defined terms, as long as our terms are understandable and reasonable.

And one of our concerns is that when

you -- aside from their admissions, the way you

generally prove copying in a software copyright

infringement case is comparing source code. That's not

a -- that happens in all copyright cases involving

source code. I mean, on software, you compare source

code.

And that's why before we even served a single request, the very beginning of this case, the parties filed a 26(F) report. Everybody had a different take on everything, the defendants' portion, plaintiffs' portion, but there was one thing that everybody was universal on. We said to the judge, "This is going to involve source code review, thousands of lines. Tedious reviews of source code. So we have to have more time than normal." That's at Docket 46, page 4, paragraph 6. I know you've seen it in the briefing, so I won't quote

it, unless you want me to. But it's basically the parties know that we're going to need experts to review this stuff.

And you should know, Your Honor -- I mean, I think the impression is being given that somehow we just want to have a bunch of irrelevant code to review.

There is nothing more mind numbing, hardly, than reviewing source code and comparing it. We don't benefit from being dumped a bunch of irrelevant source code.

Here is the problem: With source code,

particularly like SNMP's, you don't just, like, have it

in one place. It's kind of embedded. Like I told you,

when they build their product, they take our code and

they do what they will with it. And they might change a

little bit here and there; okay?

And they keep focusing on the version numbers. None of that matters at the end of the day. At the end of the day, we have copyrighted work; they have products. Experts will compare, and they will say how substantially similar are they and there was no accident.

And we have to have the source code for the full product because we can't let the other side, who is accused of infringing and copying, be the arbiter of

what portion of the code they say is -- is -- they deem appropriate for us to look at and compare. It's a copying case. So we need to get on that very soon.

THE COURT: And as I understand, there was a proposal that that would be done simultaneously.

MR. ASHLEY: That's what we proposed.

So what happened was: You might remember they filed a Motion to Stay Discovery. In that Motion to Stay Discovery, they hinted that, "Oh, we can't answer these requests because we have to see their source code first."

This is -- this is, like, literally right after we served our requests. We said, "Okay. Let's exchange. You want our source code, it's fine. But we've asked you for source code. Let's exchange."

We can't hide the ball or anything. You know, what's on deposit with the Copyright Office, that's what it is. It's not a trade secret case.

And we said, "Let's just simultaneously exchange it." They said no. That was offered, I think, in the end of 2020, or the beginning of 2021, like within a few weeks of our first requests which we're still fighting about.

What they want to do, Your Honor -- I'm kind of jumping ahead here to the issue, but what they want to

do is: They want us to produce our code on deposit at the Copyright Office. They want to go look at it, and they want to produce potentially subsets, if anything, subsets of their codes and products, the parts that they want to produce. And we think that doesn't work. And I'm going to go into that a little bit more.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ASHLEY: So that's the liability portion.

The damages -- and I'm not talking about the breach of contract claim. The damages portion in a copyright case, there is multiple components of damage. There is the component you probably think of, which is sort of the compensatory component, you know, out of pocket and whatnot. I'm not saying -- I'm not trying to delineate which damages we can get, but there is that damages component.

But most people putting in the word "damage" in a copyright case, also a component you're entitled to, which is disgorgement of profits. And these are very profitable, massively-expensive products. These are not the router that you buy at Best Buy. These are hundreds of thousands of dollars, and -- I mean, per product.

I'm not saying -- I don't know that for sure because I don't have all the figures, but these are big-deal products. And SNMP is a big deal in these

products. It's a reason why they didn't take it out right away.

And our only obligation as the plaintiff under the Copyright Act for disgorgement of profits in a case like this where the software -- we're going to show the software that's in the product, the infringing software, our obligation is to state, What are your gross revenues on these products? And it is their obligation --

(A discussion was had off the record amongst co-counsel for the plaintiffs.)

MR. ASHLEY: Oh, yeah, yeah. I should -- I should -- I should -- I should clarify one thing. I'm jumping ahead because I said they are -- they are offering to produce code that's in their product. They haven't even agreed to do that yet.

Their offer is -- in their offer for a simultaneous exchange, theirs is, "You give us all yours on deposit with the Copyright Office," and Brocade says, "We'll give you back the code you sent us if we have it." You know, they don't tell us if we have it. That doesn't tell us what's in the product.

I'll get to the competing compromises in a moment, but I misspoke.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ASHLEY: So -- but what happens is:

Defendants have an advantage right now on the damages case. It's kind of reversed, in terms of who has the asymmetry of information. They have all the information. They're fine to sit here and do nothing for as long as they can because they know they're going to have to produce the gross revenues. But then what happens is, there is a fight. The defendants have to prove costs that are properly deductible under copyright law so they can show that they -- they can reduce those costs, in terms of how much they have to disgorge.

They also have to show if they're going to try, oh, the bottom-line profit, it shouldn't be apportioned a hundred percent to the infringing use; it should be -- that there is other features that matter.

So things that talk about what's important to the product, our software or something else, will be important, and they control it all right now.

So they're very to happy say, "What are you talking about? I don't understand what you mean by related to the financials," or, "We'll produce documents sufficient to show." I don't want documents sufficient to show. They will just give me a big cost. I want to understand the costs. They say, "Well, you don't need to know anything from the day before the breach." Of course, we do. I want to know if what they're saying

now about their margins is consistent with what they said before the margins.

They talk about these products internally. How profitable are they? Are we making money? How much money are we making?

And we haven't gone far back at all. The breach was in 2017. We're going to January 1st, 2017. You've probably seen cases where when there is a breach in 2017, you go back two or three years, four years, five years to get a complete picture.

I think we even cited a case, maybe, that you decided where that was the case. So we're not being pigs here about how far back we go. In fact, as it turns out, they picked the exact same time period,

January 1st, 2017 until today, or they have none at all, where ours are pretty much all January 1st, 2017 up through. And, actually, they don't even say up to today. They want to stop all -- not all, but significant, important productions on the date of the Complaint. Like damages, as if they're selling something after the date of the Complaint, it doesn't somehow become relevant.

So you could probably see now why we have some breadth to our -- our damages discovery. And what normally happens there is: There is a dialogue with the

other side. They say, "Well, this would encompass this. It would encompass that. We have this and we have that." And then you decide, "Well, okay. That sounds like it's marginally relevant and too burdensome, so we won't do it. We will agree not to." But they don't do that. So, that's damages.

And then there is wilfulness. So this is not like some -- and you have patent cases, for instance, where somebody is going along on their merry way selling products, and then all of a sudden, bam, eight years later, somebody says, "You're infringing my patent. I want damages back as far as the statute or latches allows."

This is a willful infringement case, or that's what we intend to prove. 2017, can we do it? No. Then from 2018 to '20, trying to hunt them down on what they're doing with our software, all the while they're infringing; they're selling.

So we've propounded a lot of the discovery saying, "What did you say to get" -- but after John Wood writes this e-mail, what happens? There has got to be discussions. This is a big deal.

What about the discussions internally? And today, as of today, after a year of discovery, we don't have a single e-mail between them. We don't have a

single e-mail. We don't have a single line of source code. They tout that they have produced these documents. The document production is always correct. We file a motion, or whatever applies to you after you set a hearing and things start to roll in. But most of them are like SEC filings, public documents of that sort.

We don't have any documents yet. And it's so easy for them to produce saying, "Here is our product that you've accused. Here is the revenues. Here is the costs." They keep that. They can get that. That's something that any plaintiff who can delineate the accused products in the Complaint should get. We shouldn't have to prove our case for that.

By the way, I just showed you we have more than you almost ever get in a copyright case. You get admissions saying, "What are you using without a license?" And they give it to you. And now they say, "Huh? What? Why do I have to produce this information?" Actually, they don't even say that. They say -- I don't think they want to say, "We're not going to produce it." They exclude it that it isn't relevant. They say, "We will." But when? Why are we still doing this? We've got expert reports in four months.

Well, I'll tell you why. It's the asymmetry of

information. They have our source code. Make no mistake about it, they have our source code. We licensed it to them. They can be looking at it right now. We don't have their source code.

They claim they need our source code on deposit with the Copyright Office. And that's what I'm going to get into right now is the source code because it is a critical issue. It is so time sensitive. They say, "Well, we can't give you our code because we don't understand the case. We don't know where this software is in this because you've sued us for copyright infringement." You know, "The stuff before the case, that was" -- "We just wanted to give you money for free. It wasn't copyright infringement." Of course, they always knew it was copyrighted.

Now they're saying they haven't seen a deposit copy, but what does that matter right now? What does that matter for them to go back and say, "Here is the product in" -- I mean, "the source code in our product." We can't change what's with the Copyright Office. And we said we'll do it simultaneous.

Who's hiding the ball? We don't have -- we don't have nothing to hide. This is not like a -- they cite these trade secret cases where a Court is really disturbed because somebody comes in, like, usually a

competitor, like, this is their Puerto Rico case, and somebody comes in and says, "I'm suing you for" -- "my competitor, for trade secrets they have. Let me see your trade secret. Let me see your source code." And the Court says, "No, you have to show your trade secrets first so that you can't adjust what your trade secrets are by what you see." So you make them come in so they can't hide the ball.

It's -- it's the defendants that are trying to do that. It's the exact opposite. They want to see code, come up with arguments, and then what they want to do is be the arbiters of what is produced. It's real simple what should be produced. What's in the product?

They haven't put in any affidavit of -- that it's burdensome. Almost every case they cite -- and I'm happy to go into them. Almost every case they cite, there is a detailed affidavit where somebody says, "This is going to be really hard."

It's not going to be hard for a company like Broadcom or Extreme. They keep it in a source code file. But the way they're kept, it's just like a -- you probably have Word files and Outlook files, and you have a folder and you have subfolders. Every time you do something, you put it in a new folder. And you have programs within them. And they can copy them. It's

harder to try to go back and figure out, well, which lines of code should I show SNMP.

And by the way, do you think we're going to agree on that? We can't agree on the most basic stuff. We will be in here every week trying to argue that they're not producing enough. That even happens in some of their cases.

So they haven't done what the -- the cases that they cite litigants did. And, moreover, in this district, it is crystal clear. We don't have to prove our case to get discovery. If they want to claim our software is not registered, sobeit. They will get all -- we will do a simultaneous exchange. They can spend time on that. That defense will go away very quickly, I can tell you, when this thing they're trying to -- this trick they're trying to employ where we have to produce ours and they can, like, decide what percentage of the code to produce.

If you rule against that, I think this whole argument about registration is going to be gone. And I'll show you why. If you have the Complaint, I can -- I think I can explain what they're doing, but they're really cagey about it. So I may get it partially wrong. But I think I got the gist of it.

And if you turn to the Complaint, page $7 \, --$

just let me know when you're there.

THE COURT: I'm there.

MR. ASHLEY: So, paragraph 33 -- and, by the way, it's the Complaint's allegations that govern, not their defenses.

But they claim that there was an admission by us that our software is not registered, the software that's at issue in this case. There was not.

They're -- they're -- and they never quote it, by the way. And you might -- you might notice that we asked that the meet-and-confer calls be transcribed. In one of the exhibits, there is dialogue between Ms. Weber and people over there saying, "We want it transcribed. We keep having these misunderstandings." They said, "No, we won't do it." That was in July. That's when the admissions supposedly occurred. And they don't quote it as an admission.

But what matters is paragraph 33, "SNMP Research has registered the copyrights for the software at issue in this case collectively," and then it sets forth.

I'm not going to spend an inordinate amount of time on this, but it does bear looking at this product list. You see this product? This is the software. And you'll see it says Version, like Version 15. 15.2,

15.3, 15.4, 16, and so on.

So the way it works is: The 15 and the 16, those whole digits, those are effectively -- and people use different terminology, but they're releases. It's like a product -- I mean, you know, it's a release and/or you can call it a version. It's a major release. 16, 15.

Then you have a dot and you have another one.

This is -- and this is SNMP's designation. Not

everybody does it like that. I don't want to convey

that. But SNMP's designation throughout its existence

has been that that first number is the major release;

next one is the minor release.

But there is other ones, too. So you can get up to four. So, but, like, you'd have -- and I'm making this up. I don't know if there is one of these versions, but you can have a 13.2.1.6.

And I may have this wrong, but I know the major is the first, the minor release is the second, and the other ones are, like, patches and bug fixes and revisions. They're minor.

And so what happens is -- the way it happens from a copyright registration perspective is: You know, 16.2 will encompass all the stuff before it because you're just putting in more files. That's all you're

doing is putting in more files. And if you have a 16.2.0, you have a bug fix one, maybe three bug fixes, three. You might even do them in a week. You don't register each of those separately. Nobody does, hardly.

What Jeff does is: He just -- or Dr. Case does is: He -- if it's not -- if it's -- if it's 16.2 and then it's, like, 16.2.0.1, some of the stuff that wasn't in 16.2 will just get wrapped into 16.3. Or if there isn't a 16.3, it will go to 17. That's what happens.

We'll show that if they want us to. John would have told them that. So when they say, like, in their -- I think one lawyer says it in a declaration, but I think the other one says it in a brief. They say something like, "Oh, there is an admission that..."

They leave out all this.

What they want to do, I think, and I'm not sure -- what they want to do is: They want to say one of the versions that we sent was 16.2.0.9. Major 16, minor release 2, 0 revisions, bug 9. And Dr. Case is probably cringing as I'm probably getting this wrong. I'm just getting you the point of it, the gist of it.

They got and have said they were using that.

Now, they may have been using others as well. We're not going to take their word for what they're using. And I think what they want to do is say -- they keep asking

you, "Oh, you should just make them define SNMP software as to what's on Table 1."

Well, then, they can take it back and go, "Hmm, we have no responsive documents." Table 1 doesn't say 16.2.0.9. Or they want to say, "Okay. It's what's registered." They take it back, get into the conference room, "What does registration mean according to us? We believe that's not registered, despite what Mr. Ashley just said. We will produce nothing or we produce what we want."

They can make all these arguments after we do our simultaneous production. They can make them all.

But none of them should mean they don't have to produce the source code in the products that we actually allege in the Complaint. All of it. They should have to produce all of that.

I'm going to get, in a moment, to what they should be doing to find other products, including stuff after the Complaint. But at least the stuff in the Complaint, there should be no issue. That's why we offered this compromise. Let's start with that. Then we could have been reviewing source code for the past, you know, ten months and fighting about what other products they have to identify.

You know, when you're taking depositions and

finding out whether or not things that are being represented are accurate, there is going to be additional stuff that has to be produced, most likely.

So that the argument on that it's not registered is -- that's a merits-based argument, and they should have no problem doing a simultaneous exchange if that's their concern.

But they have other roadblocks, too. They say they can't tell us which source codes and which products have the source code. Well, we've told them. We've alleged them. So they should have to produce them. It's not burdensome for them to do so. If they have nothing to hide, it shouldn't be a problem.

Also, they had no problem finding it in the pre-suit discussions, and they say, "Oh, well, you shouldn't really consider that because," you know, "no lawsuit had been filed yet." That's exactly why you should consider it.

Just like when you're trying to see -- when the parties are fighting about what do the -- what does this term of the contract mean to us; right? What does that mean? Do you pay more attention to what they're saying when outside counsel is arguing in litigation or what they said before?

So they can find it. There is tools. There is

commercial tools that you run to find searches -- I mean, to search for similar code.

And just so you know, our code is supposed to have in it copyright SNMP. It's embedded in this, in the source code. They're supposed to keep it in there.

Now, the reason why we're not saying just search for that is: They might not have it. And that wouldn't be an excuse not to produce; right? You can't take out the copyright designation and then not produce the code itself if it's not exactly identical.

So I think what they're trying to do is split a bunch of hairs. I think they know exactly what we're asking for. They knew it before and they know it now, and what they're trying to do is create ambiguity so they simply don't have to produce the source code in the products we have accused based on their admissions so that we can't do a comparison and show copying, which I'm sure we will.

And I think if you ordered the production of the source code in the products accused in the Complaint -- and we'll talk about the rest later -- some of this will go away very quickly because we will be able to look at it. And they can look at our copyright registrations and make any arguments they want. That's their right.

So, not deterred. They also say they're too secret. The source code is too secret. We told the Court this is going to involve a lot of source code review. It's not too secret.

I don't know if you've seen the protective order in this case. It's Docket 93. The key pages for source code are pages 9 through 10 and 18 through 24. It is a very robust protection.

Just to give you an example, the computers are set up in their attorneys' offices. They can't be connected to the network. They can actually monitor the in-person review. There is very few people that can view it. Like, if it's an expert, you have to disclose the expert in advance. They get to see if it's a competitor.

And Dr. Jeff is not -- Dr. Case is not selling switches. I'm not trying to compete with Broadcom.

He's certainly not trying to find out their secrets.

He's certainly not trying to find out any secrets on his own code. And he -- and he couldn't review anything unless he actually authored it, or the company, you know, SNMP authored it, and we, of course, should be able to see our own code.

But there is extremely robust protections. And you know what? They haven't put in a single affidavit

or even argued in a brief what's missing.

We negotiated that protective order for seven months. You might remember, in your prior order, you were talking about the protective order. It was not -- it wasn't entered until six months later, and you know we aren't going slow. Every accusation is that we're trying to move this fast, trying to be careful but move it fast. So we know who slowed it down. But it was a very extensive negotiation. And you should know we gave a lot. We just wanted the source code. So we gave and gave and gave on these negotiations, and now we hear, "Oh, source code? That's too secret."

And, by the way, once again, the cases they cite, there is declarations talking about why it's literally the lynchpin of their entire company, that this particular code -- one of them involved, like, the Google search engine. They didn't put in any declarations.

I've already told you that the cases they cite are largely -- are, I think, universally irrelevant.

There is one case that's very relevant that we cited, and that's Brocade, when it was suing for copyright infringement over software, its software, and it sued AlO in its home district, Northern District of California, Brocade's, and it was before Judge Lucy Koh

at the Northern District and on her way up to the Ninth Circuit.

And I don't know if this was one that we had to cite a docket in that case, but it's a decision you should definitely reread. It's Docket 86. And the key pages -- yeah, we can hand it up to you, but -- can I enter the well?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. ASHLEY: It's very thick. Most of it is not that relevant.

I'm not going to quote it for you, but you can flip, if you want, to page 51. Basically there is a dialogue occurring where -- there was also a trade secret involved in that case, Your Honor, and so they had a trade secret claim, a patent claim, and a copyright infringement claim.

And reading on, Judge Koh said if something is only with respect to the trade secret claim, that doesn't have to be produced right now, right away, source code, because first you have to delineate the trade secrets. And then you don't want the plaintiff to be able to look at the code to make the trade secrets.

But she said, for the copyright claim, produce now.

And the defendant in that case was trying to do just what they're trying to do now. "I don't" -- "I

can't produce the whole" -- "I'm not going to produce all the code for the product. That would be burdensome." And Judge Koh said, "Patent." And they didn't have any answer, any affidavit. And, of course, it's not true. And then they wanted to pick and choose, but, "Okay. If you're not going to produce it for the product, then what are you going to do?" "Oh, we'll" -- "They're claiming that we're infringing their copyright code. I'll look at their code and I'll look at the stuff that might look like it and I'll give it to them. But," you know, "I'll deny infringement."

And then Judge Koh said -- this is at page 51, 4 through 10, "I've never heard that the defendant gets to pick and choose what files of the source code they want to produce because based on their own opinion, they feel like these particular files are the only ones that are relevant to the plaintiff's patent case or copyright case." Remember, the answer is different for trade secrets.

Mr. Marino, who is Brocade's counsel, "I don't think I can take their word for it." The Court overruled -- overrules the objection.

And we can't take their word for it and the Court shouldn't take their word for it. And we're not asking them to take our word for what's on deposit for

the Copyright Office. We're saying simultaneous exchange.

And I think later in this when Judge Koh realizes that the trade secret's in the actual source code, they do a simultaneous exchange. That's what Brocade suggests. "Okay. Then, fine, we'll do a simultaneous exchange." Exactly what we're suggesting about.

Let's remember again where you begin with in a discovery dispute is: Is there a privilege? Is there a work product? In any of the broad view of relevance, it's clearly relevant. It's relevant, but the "it," it's kind of -- it might encompass a few other things. Well, fine. Then we're going to have a much harder source code review. But it's relevant.

And then on burdensome, you're supposed to put in -- it's crystal clear. They know this rule. They keep talking about how many times we've moved. They know the law. It is the party claiming burdensome, undue burden, or disproportionality has the obligation to put in evidence or affidavits, make a showing. You can't just say it. And they haven't done that. And so that should end the issue.

So I now want to talk about the compromises. So our compromise from the beginning on all this was,

"You produce the code at the very least to start with in the products we've identified in the Complaint as at-issue products. We'll produce everything" -- you want our code? Tell us what code you want. Do you want the code? Tell us everything. We'll do it simultaneous."

So let's talk about their compromise. Their compromise, which I alluded to earlier was, no, we have to give them all of our code. So that's what they have requested; right?

Oh, I should also note we've requested the code of the very first instance. Like, literally, probably on the first week you could actually propound the request, we asked for it because we needed to start reviewing it.

Their requests came, I think, nine months, a year later. Now, part of that can be explained, Your Honor, for instance, by them saying, "Well, we had told them it will not be" -- "We will not claim it's a waiver of" -- "of jurisdictional arguments or venue arguments." So that's not the excuse. But they might have been waiting on your ruling. So -- to propound the official requests; right? We had already offered it. You don't even have to request it. We'll do it.

But you issued your ruling in June. There is

no immediate request from Extreme. It comes, like, a month, month-and-a-half later.

Broadcom doesn't ask for our code for, like, four or five months after -- they were saying the whole time, "We can't do it because, gosh, it's so unfair that plaintiff wants to proceed with discovery, but we can't" -- the offer was always on the table. But then you had asked for it. But they're saying in their compromise, they go first. We have to give them our code. That's what they're requesting because -- in front of us, and then we don't get what we want.

What they say we get -- Brocade says, "We'll give you back the code that you sent us as part of the license if we have it." "If we have it." Why do they say "if we have it"? Do you have it or not?

And Extreme says something along the lines of, "Uh, us, too." You know, "Whatever we got from Brocade, we'll give you."

But we don't want -- we know what code we gave them. We want the code that's in the products. And you can bet come trial time, they're not going to say that's sufficient if we prove that they have what we gave them. What we prove is that they used or substantially copied -- you know, they copied -- it doesn't have to be identical. They copied our code. And I don't care

which version it is. If it's copyrighted, it's copyright infringement.

So their compromise is not a compromise at all.

They want to offer the words because we said the words.

So I don't think you should be duped into that being a true compromise. It truly is not.

And they really should not have anything to hide here if there was no copying. They will be able to -- they will be able to prove us wrong or we won't make our burden.

And I'm just going to touch on a related issue. You probably saw references to build environment and install images. And I think their first argument is, "We don't even know what those are." It is absurd that Broadcom or Extreme would say, "We don't know what a build environment or an install image is." In fact, they end up citing cases later saying, "Oh, yeah. We're not going to allow a build environment because in that case, it wasn't worth the cost." And sometimes it's not. I'll give you an example based by cases.

There are patent cases, and sometimes in a patent case, there is source code that's at issue. But in a patent case, you're not -- you're not comparing for copying; you're accusing instrumentalities. And sometimes what the plaintiff wants is: It'll make my

life easier in proving what it does by doing the build environment.

And so the Court says, no, it's not that important. And in their cases they cite, there is a technical expert that comes in and says -- from the defendants -- says, "This is an undue burden and there is no payoff because..."

But, here, they haven't put any evidence of an undue burden. And so I'll tell you what the build environment is. Why is the source code not enough for the product? Because what can happen is: You can have a source code tree that -- that beads multiple products; okay?

So when they produce us -- if you ordered them to produce the source code for all the products that are accused in the Complaint and they did, and then we went back with our experts and we proved, oh, there is copying; here is the substantially-similar parts, you know, from over here and there and there in this folder and that folder. We lay it out. You could see Brocade or Broadcom or Extreme saying, "You didn't prove it's in the product. That could have gone in other products or not accused products that have not been used. We just gave you the full source code tree. You want the full source code tree? You got it."

So the build environment basically is -- I'm probably going to get this a little wrong. It's basically a set of instructions, essentially software, and they're followed to take the human readable source code and turn it into the actual software program that runs on the finished product. So when you have it, it's a big part of the complete picture of what portion of that code is in the product and how.

And the install image is sort of created from the build environment. Almost -- I don't know if you want to call it, like, the release, or some sort of a -- basically what it does is: It's the actual object code, the binary code. It's a depiction of it. It's a depiction of it saying this is what's in that product and it goes out with every product. It's for the install.

And when I say it goes out, I mean, it's probably, like, downloaded, or, you know, in a link or something, but -- or already included. But the point is: They have the install image for every single product. It's not burdensome for them to produce it. It's not super sensitive. It goes to the customers. And those two pieces help us determine, like, complete the puzzle where we have, okay, give us the source code for the product. We can compare that source code with

our source code. They can do the same. Everybody gets to do it. We'll show copying. We have the build environment and we have the install image. Now we can prove it's in the product.

Oh, by the way, I'm not just claiming the admissions we have, but we want to do the work, all the work, to make the case.

And they never really -- I mean, the fact that they're saying, "I don't know what this means," or, "We can't explain it," I mean, we are -- we were shocked.

Really? That's Broadcom? This is your -- I mean, a highly-technical company, and you don't know what an install image or a build environment is? You're citing cases using those terms.

And we always feel like if we try to define it, it's going to be twisted against us. We asked the question. They have to answer it under oath, eventually, I hope, and I think once you order it, maybe some of the game playing will stop.

Once again, though, we offered a compromise.

We said, "It's not our goal to create more work for us.

Dr. Case is not looking to outspend Broadcom and

Extreme. If you will tell us when you produce the

code" -- I mean, "when you produce the source code tree,

if you'll tell us" -- okay? -- "and the Court that's the

complete code for the product and all that went in it, then we don't need the build environment."

They should still have to produce the install images because those just go out with the products. But we don't need the build environment if you'll do that because then they just can't say later we didn't make our burden of taking the code, the software, and doing the comparison but somehow not prove that that copied portion was in the product.

But -- and they don't have to agree to what we suggested. But if they don't, then they would have to show it's burdensome to do -- unduly burdensome to do what we're asking, and they haven't. And it's undeniably relevant, and they know what we're talking about, and I hope you understand it now.

Now, up until now, I've been focusing on the product. To me, what I call the low-hanging fruit. This is the easy ones. It's what they admitted before the Complaint. You don't even get that in a copyright case, usually.

But on top of that, you know, we have it in writing, and we can allege it under Rule 11 and then some, and those are easy. Like, they should have to produce all that. So I think that's the bare minimum of what we're requesting from you today is: Produce that,

and we'll simultaneously produce our code and we can get to work; all the parties can get to work.

We're still going to have to decide this issue of, well, why do we have to rely solely on what they said pre-suit? Like, what if they give us the wrong letter in one of their e-mails on the product, or there is another one. They know what's in their line. Their engineers know exactly where they get their software. And so we asked the question under oath, "Are there any? List them all." And they say, "We just" -- "It's too confusing because" -- this is the key rogs, Interrogatories 1 and 2 for all the defendants. And Rog -- I'm just paraphrasing. Rog 1 is basically saying tell us all of your products that have SNMP software and then give us all the information, the release and version number and whatnot.

And one of my colleagues will be talking about the details of that. But at a high level, it tells us what you're using. I mean, which products are using our software under oath. And then tell us which people helped you answer that question so we can depose them.

Rog 1 is -- and then Rog 2 talks about partner products because the way some of these companies work is: They might sell a product themselves, but they might also have it sold through an OEM, you know,

another entity that -- like, it could be a Hitachi or somebody. It's the same product. We re-branded it. We want to know who has got our software out there and how much was sold.

They say they can't answer it because they're very confused and it's overbroad and unduly burdensome, the definition of SNMP software. You saw it all through there. And it literally pervades almost the entirety of discovery.

And you could imagine, it's not easy to get perfect agreement between parties on something like this. And I think the concern of defendants is, "Oh, well, then we're admitting that we did something."

Well, that's kind of what we want. And you have to -- you have to admit what's true if it's true. And sometimes you don't want to, but we're allowed to frame our requests the way we want to, as long as they're -- as long as they're reasonable and they're understandable.

And this is not about lack of understanding.

I'll read you -- I took you through all those e-mails at the beginning of this. And here is the definition:

SNM- -- and I'm not putting all the other caveats. But SNMP software means any of the following: One, software provided by SNMP Research to Brocade; two, software

licensed by SNMP Research to Brocade; or, three, any software created by SNMP Research which is or was in the possession of whoever.

That way if they try to claim, "I don't know what was licensed," or, "Was it truly licensed," if they have it, then identify it.

And that's not just if they have the exact replica of the Version 16.2.0.9. It is -- they know if they're using parts of our software. And if they want to deny it, they should do it under oath.

But this is a reasonable definition. Now, they say, "Oh, gosh, we have to search 150 entities." They put in a one-sentence declaration, one -- I think it was Mr. Blum, one sentence that says words to the effect, "We have 150 subsidiaries." Not, "We don't know which ones are doing what." In fact, you'll see repeatedly throughout their brief, they say, "Virtually none of which had anything to do with this case." So, fine. Do the ones that do have something to do with this case.

Remember that very first letter I showed you where when they were asking for a license, they were so cagey on our affiliates? They used defined terms. So we don't want to be tricked. We want to know the full scope.

And, you know, we tried -- like, for instance, with Brocade, we said, "Oh, we know there is a prior license or a current license," so we excluded that. If you read the definition of SNMP's software, we said, "We don't want that. That's the last thing we want is stuff about" -- and if they have another contract they want to exclude, that's how you work these out. You say, "Oh, this is going to encompass other stuff."

But the notion that Broadcom has to go back and go, "Wow, let's go through all 150 entities and figure out what they're selling. I have no clue where our product line is that we mentioned prior to this suit," is not -- it's just not plausible. They know. They're dodging. That's why they're doing it.

And when they say, "Oh, we want to tie it to a table or a copyright," that's the way they want to do it so they can do some internal machinations and then not produce.

So Broadcom is a little more complicated because we're going beyond -- right? -- the products in the Complaint. They certainly should -- if you look at the answer, we had a -- we had a -- we tried to work out a deal where we said, "Okay." You know, "You can't find them. So at least for the universe in the Complaint that are identified, let us know." And all they did

was, they rewrote what was in the Complaint and said,
"We don't have anything," which is not really what we
wanted. But their claim is, "Well, because we don't
know if it's registered." Well, so, fine. This is what
we told them a year ago. Then we'll give you what's on
register two simultaneously with your production of the
code for the products that are already in the Complaint
because we're not going to take their word on anything
for that. That's -- those are in this case to stay
until they win on the merits.

But for the other stuff, if you -- if you think you need our code, then sobeit. Why wouldn't they have taken us up on that? They say, "Oh, well, we have to know and understand." They don't have to know or understand anything. They'll have that defense. We can't change it. It is or it isn't registered.

So, I don't want to say I don't want you to order Rog 1, I do. I want you to order Rogs 1 and 2, for them to answer it as crafted with our definition of SNMP software. But if you want to give them additional time so they can do their analysis after -- if you order, you know, a simultaneous exchange, that's fine with us. It's just that we're running out of time, you know, to have these iterations and back and forth.

If they really wanted to do that, they

shouldn't have done what they did in the delay. And I understand that we're not adding most of the stuff prior to your ruling, but a lot of this stuff could have -- we could have worked out a protective order. We said we wouldn't assert jurisdictional issues on source code. A lot of this could and should have been worked out.

So whenever they're proposing something, just remember, it usually takes a long time and the clock is running and there is this asymmetry of information.

Now, I talked mostly about source code and product identification, and -- and I'm going to talk very briefly, but my colleagues are going to go into more detail on it, what they're doing with these boilerplate and general objections. We briefed this is couple times because we had one -- one motion to compel that you -- they keep saying that you denied it. I think you denied it without -- with leave if we couldn't work it out in a meet and confer.

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. ASHLEY: They somehow think they have won. They knew this law. I can't even -- they know the law within the district courts in the Sixth Circuit that says you don't do this. You don't just have a long list of general objections and then say, "I hereby incorporate them all by reference."

And if you do, you back off of that during the meet and confer. But they don't. And they're very sophisticated lawyers, and there is a reason why they don't is because they don't really want to resolve things. They want to have this -- why they don't want to respond to Ms. Weber's e-mails when she tries to state, "Here is what we've done and agreed to." They say, "We can't do that because we just can't bother with" -- "it's too adversarial."

But it just means they can always go back to another objection no matter what we do. We can't close the loop. And that's why when they say, "We're still meeting and conferring. We're still thinking about this a lot. Boy, they should have told us we had a motion," they just want to run out the clock. And it's a perfect way to do it and it's in direct defiance of the law.

And I'll tell you a really laughable -- I don't know if they figured this out, but in Brocade and Broadcom's latest ones, they incorporate by reference the objections in the prior one.

Now, Broadcom takes out the one that Your Honor took care of in your ruling, but they still do leave in all the others. So, like, right now, as we sit here, the taxpayer privilege, which they take out of their current responses, gets embedded back in by

incorporating by reference all of the objections in the prior superceded responses. That's how laughable it is. You can't ever tie them down because of that. And it's directly in violation of the rules, and it's also in vi- -- they keep trying to justify this, but if you assert an objection, you're supposed to have a reasonable basis for it.

And, like, for instance, undue burden, and you should be able to say, "I am withholding documents based on that objection." They say, "Oh, we've told you what we're doing." No, they haven't. And the rule is clear. If you assert an objection, you can't just say without waiving. You have to say are you or are you not withholding documents. That lets us streamline the issues and know what we're fighting instead of a phantom. And it's part of the reason why we're here on all this stuff.

Believe me, we want to resolve these issues so we can get to work and get documents that we need and get source code that we need. And I think that should speak volumes because they don't want to reach that resolution. They are struggling not to reach a resolution.

And I will tell you, also, I believe that a case like this where there is no privilege asserted,

there is no work product protection asserted, nothing is hinging on that, what you're really looking at when somebody says it's irrelevant is, is it burdensome? Like, if you end up producing a few things that are irrelevant or many things that are irrelevant, it makes our life harder, but is it unduly burdensome for you to do it, to run the search, to have the extra custodian look; right? That's really what it comes down to, and they have completely failed that. They have utterly failed on meeting their burden of putting in an affidavit or explaining in detail why. How many custodians is it? How many of those 150 entities do you have to search? Do you not know? Nobody comes in -- nobody comes in and says, "I don't know the answer. We can't tell."

And with that, I think that this -- this should be relatively easy, almost across the board. Other than the definitional terms, which I want you to understand that we're trying to work it out, but we're also trying not to get gamed where we don't get what we need.

So those are the issues I had planned on covering, and I'm happy -- if you'd like, I can tell you which -- which issues they pertain to by number in the two motions, if you'd like, or we could do that at the end, or maybe this is all you need. I just didn't want

to 2 THE COURT: Maybe let's do that at the end. 3 MR. ASHLEY: At the end? Okay. 4 So, unless you have questions, I was planning 5 on turning this over to my colleagues on some of the more discreet issues, but also still tracking what was 6 7 in the motion papers. 8 THE COURT: You can turn it over to your 9 colleagues at this time. Thank you. 10 MR. ASHLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 (A discussion was had off the record amongst 12 Mr. Neukom and Mr. Ashley.) 13 MR. NEUKOM: Good morning. I am --14 THE COURT: Good morning. 15 MR. NEUKOM: Well, I am a colleague in the Bar 16 with Mr. Ashley, but I'm not his colleague on this case. 17 I had just one administrative question for the Court. 18 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 19 MR. NEUKOM: I confess that I thought this 20 hearing was not going to go the duration, and now it appears it's going to go, and Ms. Demers and I have 21 22 return flights. We have both signed a letter. 23 aware of the rules around the use of phones in the

courtroom. If it's okay with the Court, Ms. Demers may

send a short e-mail on quiet mode just to make sure that

24

25

we reschedule our flights. 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 Thank you. If we have an extra MR. NEUKOM: 4 night in Knoxville, we've suffered worse fates than 5 that, but thank you. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. 7 MR. WOOD: Good morning, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Good morning. 9 MR. WOOD: John Wood. 10 So I wanted to cover a couple of issues. 11 Mr. Ashley mentioned Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2, which 12 are really pretty core to this case. And if you look at 13 Brocade's response to the interrogatories, which is -- I 14 believe it's 116-13 in there. And so this -- this, in some ways, is the 15 16 foundational question, and it should be pretty simple, 17 but it's -- and has Your Honor found that? I don't want 18 to start until you have it. 19 THE COURT: You gave me the docket number of 20 116-13? 21 MR. WOOD: Yes. Is that right? 22 That should be their response -- their 23 supplemental response to the first set of 24 interrogatories. 25 MS. WEBER: Yes, it's Exhibit L to the --

1 Yes, it's Exhibit L to the Weber --MR. WOOD: 2 MS. WEBER: It's under seal, so I'll get the 3 exhibit number. 4 MR. WOOD: I think the unsealed version is 117 -- is it --5 6 MS. WEBER: 118-3. 7 MR. WOOD: 118-3. Sorry about that. 8 THE COURT: I'm there. 9 MR. WOOD: Okay. So, this, as I said, was 10 foundational. We're simply asking them to identify all 11 products that contain or use SNMP Research software. 12 And this is the same question we asked them pre-lawsuit. 13 We need to know what products are using the software so 14 we know what you need a license for, and then we'll 15 figure out the terms of that license and how much it 16 costs. 17 And they had no problem answering that question 18 pre-lawsuit. And now, as Mr. Ashley said, what they 19 have done in their answer -- if you turn over to page 20 13. Starting on page 13, they have given us a table. Well, this is the same table that we gave them, which is 21 22 in the Complaint, which is the table they gave us 23 pre-lawsuit. So they have simply given it back to us. 24 But then they say in their response -- let me 25 find that -- that they're not going to say any of these

products actually have SNMP Research software. And that's the whole point. We need to know if these are the products and if they have SNMP Research software.

So, as Mr. Ashley said, we proposed, "Why don't you just start with the ones you already know and we'll get started with that." They took that the wrong way, and they said, "You agreed we could just put this list, but we don't have to say they have SNMP Research software."

Well, that's not what we said at all. We still want to know which products have SNMP Research software.

They should have to answer this question and they have avoided it.

And on page 13 above the charts, they say that they are -- it's kind of in the middle, "Brocade is limiting its response to the products identified in paragraph 64 of the Complaint." As I said, they're just giving us back the list we gave them. "And we'll provide specific identifying information. In so doing, Brocade does not concede that these products contain any SNMP Research software."

Well, they haven't answered the question. They either need to -- if they're really denying that -- and the reason they're denying it is, "Your definition is so confusing, we can't figure out what SNMP Research

software means." And that's at the core of a lot of their objections is this problem with SNMP Research software.

And what they want us to do is to define it as something very narrow so they can have a way to say, "Well, these products don't contain it." So we've just said, "It's any software you got from us. You know what that is." And we've even offered -- Broadcom has another license that has SNMP Research software, and in our defin- -- and we're aware of that, and the products that use that, it's a completely different entity, we believe.

The products -- the products that use that,
they're properly licensed; so we excluded those. We
said, "We're not talking about any of those products."
And we offered them -- we said, "If you know of any
other licenses where you're properly using SNMP Research
software, we'll be glad to exclude those."

"What is the" -- "What is your problem?" They keep saying the problem is the definition. And we're just talking past each other because we know they know which products have SNMP Research software. They just keep saying our definition. "You have to narrow your definition." They say, "Narrow it to 16-2-09." Well, then if they put 16-3 in a product, they wouldn't have

to produce those products.

So it's sort of a -- a lot of their discovery is like a shell game. They want us to identify the very specific -- something very specific, and then say, "Ha, it's under a different one. You identified the wrong number," or, "You didn't identify it quite right."

And so that's why we've said, "If you have our software, tell us about it. If there is some burden with that, tell us what it is. If you have another license and we agree it's properly licensed, we'll exclude that." And we already did that with one. So we think they should have to answer this question.

And if you go to Interrogatory No. 2, I think it's very telling. Interrogatory No. 2 is asking for -- we call -- we call them partner products. And partner products are simply -- it's the same product you identified in Interrogatory No. 1, but it has a different label.

So, for example, IBM, we believe, ships some of these products, but they have a different number and they're called the IBM something. It's the same product. We believe it has our software. And so those are at issue in this case, too, because you've created the product; you're just selling it under another name.

So we don't want this to be a game of got-you

where we didn't identify the correct name, so, therefore, you don't tell us what's going on.

So if you look at their response to

Interrogatory No. 2, which is on page 19, they

don't -- they don't respond. They just say, "Brocade

identified the products listed in paragraph 64 in its

response to Interrogatory No. 1."

And it's -- and above that, they say the reason they're doing that is they're limiting its response to the products identified in paragraph 64, the list we gave them, in this action and we'll provide identifying information pursuant to our agreement.

So, it's exactly what they're doing to say,
"Aha, we got you. We got you to agree to a certain set
of products, so now we don't have to identify the ones
that are labeled differently."

Well, this is -- this is the reason we had to ask the question broadly. They're going to come up here and say, "They need to limit their definitions." This is exactly why we can't limit our definitions because they haven't denied that they're shipping products under different labels. They're just saying, "You agreed that the list you gave us is the only list at issue in this case," which is not what we agreed. We just said, "Start with that." We weren't trying to limit

Interrogatory No. 2, but they're saying, "We got you.

You agreed to this limit, so now there isn't anything to
answer on Interrogatory No. 2 because it's outside of
the limit."

So that's the problem. That's the problem we've been facing. And so then we go round and round. They say, "Well, you agreed." And we're like, "That's not what we agreed." And then they say, "You're going back on your agreement." We said, "No, that was just a start." We just wanted -- we couldn't even get off the ground. But then once we agreed to something, it gets used against us.

And I can show you that. The other big way they do this is with their entities, and Mr. Ashley hit on this, where they say, "Well, you need to identify the very specific entity that has the product." Well, how do we know those -- that's the entity that's actually using it? They switch product names -- I mean, they switch entity names. They say they have all these entities.

Our position is: You know exactly which entity are using these products and which ones are using SNMP Research software. You should have to tell us. This isn't a shell game where if we don't guess the right shell, we lose.

If there is no burden, you should have to tell us what the entity is. And if you look at Broadcom rog response 85, which -- let me find that one. It is --

Can I see the Broadcom folder there? Which number is that? I'm sorry. I meant the RFP, RFP 85, which is -- let me find that. It should be 116-14.

So we also said -- so we had such a dispute over these entities, we said, "Why don't you try answering some of these questions based on" -- and they suggested this -- "based on the entities actually named in the Complaint instead of also the affiliates?" And we agreed to that as a start; right? Let's get some answers here.

But then once we agreed to that, again, it became -- you can see requests for production No. 85. We said, "We'd like all the documents constituting the Brocade merger transaction identified at page 17 of Broadcom's 2017 Form 10-K."

So there is no question what we're talking about here. This is -- this is the merger that created this whole problem. Documents are clearly relevant. They haven't shown any burden.

Their response is -- if you turn over to the next -- the next page, "Broadcom construes the term 'Broadcom' to refer to the specific entity named as a

defendant in this action, Broadcom, Inc. No responsive non-privileged documents exist as there is no 2017 Form 10-K for Broadcom, Inc." So they're like, "Oh, we've got you again. You picked the wrong shell. You shouldn't have said" -- "You shouldn't have agreed to Broadcom, Inc. because what we're actually talking about here, it was a different entity at that time. We've changed entity names." So the entity in the merger was a different entity than the entity that exists now as the parent. And so since we named the wrong -- you don't get any documents. They're clearly relevant. It's the transaction that started all this. We want the documents.

So that's what's going on here when they're trying to get us to narrow the definitions. That's why we have the -- we're asking for Broadcom and all their affiliates because they know what it is. If there is a burden, they should have told us. They should have put it in an affidavit. Same thing with the definition of SNMP Research software. And if we can agree on those, I think that clears up a lot of these discovery issues.

I would say the other -- the other really big issue -- Mr. Ashley hit on this as well -- is they have actually agreed to answer a lot of these questions, and we've listed that in our papers. We have a category

that says they have actually agreed to answer these.

Now, especially for Brocade and Broadcom, they precede each one of those with about two pages of objections that also incorporate all of the general objections and also incorporate all of the objections from previous filings, and they say, "Subject to the objections, we're going to produce."

And so we ask them and say, "That's great, you're going to produce these documents. Are you withholding any documents based on your objections?"

They won't tell us. So how do we -- and then they don't actually produce the documents.

Mr. Ashley said, "We don't have any e-mails.

We don't have any financials. We don't have any source code. So are you actually withholding something based on this?" And they won't tell us if they are or aren't.

We don't know -- so we could argue about all these little terms that they object to. We could argue about the tax privilege that they say they can withhold on. We have no idea how that can apply. They won't take any of them out. They won't say they're not withholding based on these objections. We think they have to tell us either I'm producing everything you asked for or I'm withholding based on a specific objection. Then we can have a conversation with them.

But right now, we don't -- they just say,

"Yeah, we've agreed to produce, but we're not telling

you if we're withholding anything and we're not going to

tell you when we're going to produce it."

So Extreme, for example, their last production was October 18th, over five months ago. So they're on -- they're doing a rolling production that's not rolling. It's just -- it's stuck. So we're not getting documents. We can't judge it that way. They won't tell us what's coming, and we think by the law that they have to.

So we could go through a lot of these specific objections on the specific terms. I guess our view in some way is that ship has sailed. We're running out of time. And if they wanted to withhold documents based on those objections, they needed to tell us so we could have already had that discussion, and that's why we think they shouldn't be able to withhold based on those objections anymore because it's too late. They need to produce what we asked for with our definitions.

So I had one other issue I think I had to cover, which is the identification of the people Mr. Ashley hit on.

If you go back to Brocade Interrogatory No. 7, so we've asked them to identify all of the people who

are involved in any searches for the code because we want -- we want to know what they did.

So when they finally do answer the question and say, "These are the products that have SNMP Research software," we want to know who did the search. We want to know who did the search before when they gave us the list. We've asked that question of both Brocade and Extreme.

And so their response, again, if you look at the bottom at the end of Interrogatory No. 7, it's the second to the last sentence, they say, "Given the parties' stipulation" -- and this is that we can just cite back to you the products you listed in your Complaint; we don't have to actually do a search -- "no search for products was necessary to respond to these interrogatories."

And we've met and conferred on this. We said, "Well, what about the search beforehand?" And their response was, "Well, are you" -- "are you going to limit this request to that search?" "No, we want to know all searches you did, the ones we know about and the ones we don't because of this" -- we under -- we're seeing a pattern. Let's get you to limit as to something you already know. We'll tell you about that, and then we don't have to tell you all this other stuff and we

can -- we can move on.

So this just seems very straightforward. They did a search before. They told us the products. They need to tell us who the people are. We really don't understand why that's an issue.

And I think Extreme's objection -- we don't have to turn there -- theirs was based on priv- -- they said, "We don't know of any non-privileged information." Well, identification of a person is not privileged.

We're not asking for communications. We're just asking them to identify the people. If they want to assert privilege when we depose them, that's their prerogative, but we should be able to get the list of people that did the search, and then we can ask them whatever questions we want.

So I'm going to turn it over to the next person.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOOD: Thank you.

MS. RICE: Good morning, Your Honor. What I have is a very small part of all this. I think a lot of it has been covered in general by Mr. Ashley and Mr. Wood, but my piece of this is to cover generally the plain terms that are objected to.

There are numerous, numerous plain terms,

meaning the terms that haven't been defined in our discovery requests that we initiated to the defendants, that have been objected to and that are leading to objections stating that the questions, whether it be a document request, an admission request, or an interrogatory, are vague and confusing and can't be responded to.

For Brocade and Broadcom, there are over 170 plain terms that have been objected to; everything from -- golly -- oh, "acquisition" to "agent" to "source code" to "version" of a software. There just -- there is a plethora. They're all quoted in their response.

We've tried to work through those with the defendants, and there is a similar list, probably not as extensive for Extreme, but it's -- as my co-counsel have alluded to, when we don't have any indication of what -- whether documents or information are being withheld on the basis of an objection and we don't have responses -- although, they're promised on a rolling basis -- that allow us to make any discernment of that, we're really at a loss. We could really be here for hours trying to go through definitions of very common terms we've used.

The case law in this district and beyond, Your Honor, is that discovery is not a game of semantics;

that the parties should use common sense and reason and apply ordinary meaning to terms.

We've suggested that in our meet and confers. In that process, we were told we would receive supplemental responses. And we suggested use of the dictionary definition, or if you don't understand a term like "build environment," ask your engineers, and if you have a question, come back to us before you answer and we'll be happy to work through it with you further. We didn't get any follow-back that said, "We've looked at this term further," you know, "we've asked our engineers, let's talk about these terms further." We just got renewed responses with the same objections.

We did get, of course, promise to make some rolling productions and we've received a few documents, but, again, we're in that same kind of dilemma where we really don't know whether any of these terms are at issue and how to go through the process at this point of negotiating every simple, common word that may be objected to by either of the defendants.

We've spent hours on the phone. We've had multiple meet-and-confer calls since Your Honor's ruling last June, and at this point, as Mr. Wood said, in our perspective, the ship has, perhaps, sailed. We don't really have time to continue this back and forth that

takes several weeks to schedule a call, hours to complete a call.

And, of course, in our calls, you know, we're all discussing things, but we can't -- we can't be on the phone long enough to discuss 170 plain terms, Your Honor. It's just not a workable situation. So we would ask that you strike those objections and order that discovery be produced.

The other issue that I'd like to just briefly defer to -- or refer to is Extreme's -- the majority of Extreme's responses have been to reiterate their objections and say, "But we're still willing to meet and confer with you." Again, it's the cyclical process that Mr. Ashley has referred to. It's not workable.

We've spent many, many months trying to work through it without a lot of success; really, without much success at all, and we're running out of time. So we need the Court's intervention.

You know, I'm happy to get into the weeds on these individual terms, but, in a nutshell, Your Honor, that is part of our request.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. WEBER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. WEBER: I'd like to make -- I'll make a few

points as quickly as I can. I thank you all for your time.

Following up on just a note, given the recent productions from Brocade in the month-and-a-half leading up to this hearing, I'd like to say that Brocade so far has produced 292 documents. Broadcom has produced zero, and Extreme has produced 177 total documents.

One of the topics that I'll be addressing is identification of entities and the requests going to those.

Plaintiff seeks discovery into which Broadcom entities were involved in the 2017 transfer of SNMP source code to Extreme.

That same year, as Mr. Ashley said, only about a month before the transfer of SNMP source code to Extreme, Brocade requested consent from SNMP to assign the Brocade license. You know all that.

So identification of the Broadcom entities involved in this transfer to Extreme is relevant to numerous issues, including the scope of breach and infringement and Broadcom's participation in it.

And Broadcom's involvement also concerns this

Court's personal jurisdiction over it, which is an issue

currently pending before Judge Atchley.

Six months ago in a September meet-and-confer

call, when I asked which Broadcom entities were involved in the transfer of the data center division, Extreme stated that it was not a simple Jack versus Jane situation and that it involved a complex corporate family and so the entities could not be identified on the call.

Well, defendants in this case should by now well be able to describe which Broadcom entities were involved in the transfer of SNMP source code to Extreme.

And I'll just give you a few quick examples.

If you go to Extreme Interrogatory 11 -- and I could

just paraphrase it so we can make this go quicker,

Identify all products responsive to Interrogatory 1 that

were sold or transferred to Extreme. For each product,

identify the entity from whom you obtained the product.

And Extreme objected that this request seeks information that may be held by Broadcom or Brocade.

But which precise products were transferred to Extreme and from who is information that it should know.

It never claims it doesn't possess this information. Extreme could and should provide it, and it is, in fact, required to provide a full answer under Rule 33 under oath.

Then we have Extreme Interrogatory 14 which asks Extreme to describe Broadcom's involvement in the

transfer of SNMP Research's software that was or is in the possession of Brocade or Broadcom to Extreme, including the duration of Broadcom's involvement and the identity of persons involved and their roles. And, again, Extreme does not answer the question. It objected and said that seeks information that should be sought from Broadcom and that Extreme is not in a position to accurately or fully describe the levels, scope, or nature of the involvement of another party, including the duration of its involvement.

But as plaintiff has explained repeatedly during meet and confers, we only seek Extreme's own knowledge.

I'll walk you through one more. Interrogatory No. 15 asks Extreme to identify each individual who answered or contributed to any of the answers furnished to these interrogatories and to designate the number of each rog for which such person furnished information.

So I just went over Interrogatory Nos. 11 and 14 for which Extreme says it doesn't have the information and we should ask Broadcom.

Well, in their response to No. 15, you see they identify seven different people who furnished facts and information for Interrogatories 2 through 4. 11 and 14 are not even listed on there. Apparently, my read of

that is that they did not even attempt to get an answer about the identity of Broadcom's involvement and the nature, who was involved.

We also asked identical interrogatories of
Broadcom and Brocade. Describe Broadcom's involvement
in the transfer. Broadcom played a -- well, I shouldn't
say "played." Broadcom answered in a way that my
colleague spoke about. They construed the term
"Broadcom" to mean only the named entity, the parent
company, Broadcom, Inc., and said that the interrogatory
was nonsensical because Broadcom, Inc. acquired Brocade
after the transfer of plaintiffs' software to Extreme.

But that still doesn't answer the question about Broadcom's predecessor's involvement in the transfer, if any, and whether and to what degree other Broadcom entities were involved. Brocade did not answer the question either. So neither defendant has answered the question despite having the ability to do so.

I would point Your Honor to page 7 of Brocade and Broadcom's opposition brief. There they claim that discovery requests about specific predecessor's involvement in the conduct alleged could be proper.

But Interrogatory No. 15, which I just referenced, is not meaningfully different. It asked them to involve Broadcom's involvement in that transfer.

Broadcom and Brocade know what entities were involved and they should be required to provide that information.

Moreover, as Mr. Ashley mentioned on page 4 of the opposition brief, Brocade and Broadcom argued that of the 150 Broadcom, Inc. subsidiaries, virtually none have any relevance to do -- any relevance to this case. And so despite making that statement, they are still unable to describe Broadcom's involvement in the transfer, and that does not make sense. They have avoided taking a position on it, and they have a duty to do so and to supplement their response under Rule 26(e)(1).

I'll go to the next issue, which is time frame, and I'll try to be brief about this. We -- plaintiff served discovery requests, and the -- we served them in 2020. The time frame is January 1st, 2017, the year of the breach, to the present.

2017 is a critical year. I won't repeat what others have said. It's the year of breach and it's when the transfer of Extreme's -- of plaintiffs' software to Extreme occurred. It's also the date of the merger.

So SNMP seeks discovery after January 1st, 2017, and two issues, such as the scope of breach, wilfulness, copyright infringement, personal jurisdiction, and damages.

It also attempts to account for potential defenses that defendants will assert, who will almost certainly seek to diminish the profits attributable to infringement. So we're entitled to a full, accurate accounting of the financial information related to profit margins, cost allocations, prior to the date of termination of the license agreement and after.

After the date of termination, they would have had every incentive to adjust how costs were allocated or how the profits looked because they knew at that point that they were still using plaintiffs' software but they no longer had a license to do so.

Brocade and Broadcom objected to the January 2017 time frame as overbroad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not proportional to the needs of the case.

They would limit the time period, as Mr. Ashley said, to the date of the license termination, which is July 25th, 2019, to the date this lawsuit was filed. And they provided no explanation as to why discovery should be restricted to the date this lawsuit was filed and they do not persuasively explain why discovery dating back to 2017, the year of the breach, falls outside the extremely broad scope of discovery.

I'll just give a few examples. Brocade RFP 44

requests all materials concerning or discussing the use of our client's software and Brocade products. And that is undeniably relevant to damages and defendants' defense concerning what profits are attributable to infringement.

They, Brocade, objected to plain terms in that request, and then they unilaterally limited their production to after July 25th, 2019.

But pre-July 25th, 2019 discussions about the use of plaintiffs' software and Brocade's products is every bit as relevant to defendants' defense concerning profits attributable to infringement as discussions are after that date.

No matter when the discussions took place, they bear upon how defendants' products use SNMP, which will be relevant to their profits defense. And so Brocade should not be able to arbitrarily limit the date that it provides discovery to this request.

They also argue Brocade and Broadcom in their opposition that plaintiffs' source code requests -- and I can state them later, the specific numbers. But they say that they're overbroad because there is, quote, "no question" -- that's the opposition at 17, footnote 20 -- "that Brocade's products incorporated plaintiffs' software prior to July 25th, 2019."

So that response, to me, just further demonstrates why plaintiffs are entitled to pre-July 25th, 2019 discovery of source code.

If there is no question that plaintiffs' source code was in these products prior to July 25th, then plaintiffs are entitled to compare that source code that they just admitted contained the products to post July -- or that product contains the source code, they're entitled to compare the code after July 25th to see the types of changes, if any, that were made. And this reinforces why plaintiffs need a full picture starting the year of Brocade's 2017 breach.

I also note that defendants' own time -- well, Brocade's own time frame in the discovery request they served on us is either no limit; so dating back 30 years to the inception of SNMP, or they have sought things that -- and I'm paraphrasing -- involve all communications concerning development, which would literally involve every single document that our company has, or January 1st, 2017 to present, which is our time frame.

I can go over a few more, but the -- in the interest of time, I guess I'll underscore, Broadcom and Brocade protests are requests seeking the identities of customers pre-July 25th, 2019 and the number of sales of

products of those customers.

Brocade Rog 5 and RFP 49 requests Brocade to identify their customers and the client of each product from January 21st, 2017 to present.

First, Brocade objects that the identities of its customers is private. But we have a protective order, and they have not explained why the protective order is insufficient to protect those identities.

They also protest that the identities of the customers who sell Brocade's products containing plaintiffs' software product prior to the date of the license termination is irrelevant to the breach of contract or copyright claims because Brocade had a license to use plaintiffs' software prior to that time.

Again, Brocade is just trying to artificially obstruct the scope of discovery. And one example is that -- of why we need this information is that Brocade has persistently said it will provide certain information if it exists. And if you do a search for that, you'll see it throughout the discovery responses.

For example, for this particular request, I believe it says it will provide business records to show the number of products sold after July 25th, 2019, "if any exist," and that is a quote from the Brocade opposition at 16.

It has also made other reservations repeatedly about what other discovery it may or may not produce, including the source code that we've sent them.

So, in part, because of these repeated reservations about what evidence is even still in existence, we need information from the customers to be able to cross-check what -- has Brocade made a full production; is it accurate.

Plaintiffs, I think, in large part, aside from that reservations issue, they deserve a historically-accurate picture of Brocade's revenues, allocations, and profit margins.

As I mentioned -- well, for one, we're also entitled to subpoen these customers to confirm whatever information and business records Brocade does actually produce, and what -- because I mentioned earlier, as you know, there is discussions and license negotiations in 2018, 2019, and 2019, our client terminates Brocade's license and use rights. Brocade knew this was coming. So it did have every incentive to change the way it allocated costs and reported profit margins after that because it knew it was risking a copyright infringement suit.

So we are entitled to only a year-and-a-half of discovery prior to that time the license rights were

terminated so we can compare, do the financial calculations correspond to one another; are they consistent.

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And Brocade has not provided any declaration presenting affidavit -- or presenting evidence showing that producing this information would be a burden.

I have two more that I'd like to get through quickly. One request -- or -- sorry -- one category of requests implicates third-party confidentiality.

Brocade objects to almost all of the requests on third-party confidentiality grounds. And Broadcom similarly raises third-party confidentiality objections to all requests except one.

And one example of the language it uses is,

"Broadcom objects to this request as it requires the

disclosure of confidential and proprietary information,

documents, and tangible things of Broadcom and third

parties." That's the definition of a meaningless and

boilerplate request objection.

One example where this objection occurs is

Interrogatory No. 12 in the Brocade interrogatories, and
this requests identification of all contracts between

Brocade and all third parties to which Brocade has
provided the products containing plaintiffs' software or
provided the software itself. That's highly relevant.

Brocade asserted burden, relevance, privacy, and confidentiality obligations to providing these underlying agreements. Again, it did not provide any sort of burden, proof of burden, or declaration supporting that.

And moreover, the information is highly relevant for the reasons I just articulated. It's relevant to damages particularly because Brocade has indicated that it may not have existing admissible business records for certain requested information, and getting the contracts from third parties would enable -- or pertaining to third parties would enable plaintiffs to glean product pricing and the number of units sold and the timing and duration of these contracts so that it could then compare this information with Brocade's produced business records on the topic, if any.

Brocade Interrogatory No. 9 asks Brocade to identify revenues and costs of any other products or services sold with or as a result of the purchase of products identified in response to Interrogatory No. 1.

And we have explained on several meet-and-confer calls that this would encompass add-ons to products. Like, if you wanted to buy additional memory to go with the switch, that's a -- or that's an

additional product sold with the infringing products that we will want to include in our damages calculation. We're entitled to that information.

But Brocade objected to providing this, in part, because of third-party confidentiality grounds.

And I'd just say that, again, SNMP is entitled to a full historical picture of the revenues and costs for the profits sold of the infringing products, which is relevant to the damages and the profits attributable to infringement.

I'd note that in corollary requests in the Extreme discovery requests, Extreme does not object on third-party confidentiality grounds. We asked for all distribution documents that can show the number of products identified in response to Rogs 1 and 2, distributed, transferred, or disclosed to third parties, including the name of the third party to whom the product was disclosed. And Extreme has indicated that it will provide that. Broadcom/Brocade can and should do the same.

And last, the topic I'll discuss is personal jurisdiction over Broadcom, Inc. It is the only party that is challenging personal jurisdiction. As I mentioned, Judge Atchley is presiding over that issue, the motion is still pending, and plaintiffs served

requests last January -- sorry -
January -- December 2020 concerning personal

jurisdiction because only a week prior, defendants had

moved to dismiss or transfer the case on that basis.

In that motion, plaintiff cited authority showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Broadcom because Broadcom's own actions made it reasonably foreseeable that it would become involved in a dispute.

I think you're aware of it. The case is Baker v. LeBoeuf. It's a Sixth Circuit case, and it contemplates non-signatories being bound by an agreement that has an exclusive form flexion clause, which the Brocade license agreement has here, and it provides for exclusive venue and jurisdiction in Knox County.

Your Honor's June 25th order denying defendants' request to discovery states -- it specifically found that their participation in discovery, while the motions to dismiss are pending, will not be construed as a waiver of personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the defendants should have no problem responding to plaintiffs' request concerning personal jurisdiction to Broadcom.

And the requests that I went over previously

involving identification of entities and specifically Broadcom's involvement is one set of requests that's relevant to personal jurisdiction.

I'll mention a few more. Broadcom RFP 72, which requests all documents relating to Broadcom, Inc.'s review, awareness, or acknowledgment of the license agreement, which tracks the standard I just quoted to you or mentioned to you from Baker v. LeBoeuf, 105 F.3d 1102, Sixth Circuit.

Broadcom responded with objections to plain terms, awareness and what acknowledgment means, and defined terms, and in a July 2021 phone call, we had asked Brocade if it was ready to substantively respond to the personal jurisdiction requests or whether we needed to discuss any of the definition -- or any of the objections to plain terms, and they said they're ready to respond, but that they would keep an open line of communication with us if there was any confusion. We never got any calls, but all the same objections are still in the supplemental responses.

The request is undeniably relevant to personal jurisdiction over Broadcom and whether its actions would have made it reasonably foreseeable that it would become involved in a dispute over a license agreement.

Broadcom RFP 71 requests all documents relating

to Broadcom, Inc.'s involvement, direct or indirect, with Brocade's development or sale of derivative works with respect to our client's software.

Broadcom again responded with objections to plain and defined terms. But this request, whether Broadcom, who did not have a license for this software, the request about whether they helped Brocade create durable works is plainly relevant to the issue of copyright infringement and Brocade's breach if it provided the source code to Broadcom.

I'm trying to wrap this up, but my last example will be Broadcom RFP 18 and Interrogatory 17 where we ask for all documents relating to whether Broadcom has ever acted as an agent for Brocade and where that occurred, which is, again, relevant to that standard that I quoted you previously from Baker v. LeBoeuf.

Broadcom objects on numerous grounds,
including -- I think it's a prior objection, but it
still explicitly incorporates it -- including because
the Court has supposedly not ordered that plaintiffs are
entitled to jurisdictional discovery and because the
term "agent" is vague and undefined.

But that does not answer the question. Agent is a plainly understood term, meaning acting on behalf of, and defendants even use it in their own discovery

requests. They use it in the definition of the entities. And they can use their own understanding to respond to this one.

We served this request because Broadcom's agency and where it occurred, as I mentioned, informs the foreseeability of it being bound by the form selection clause in the license agreement.

And I note that in 2019, Broadcom, Inc. is the one that sent a letter to Extreme Networks and SNMP taking the position that the license was a type of contract that was material to the operation of the data center business sold to Extreme and that SNMP did not consent to a partial assignment of that license to Extreme.

Broadcom, Inc. sent that letter, it appears, on behalf of Brocade. In 2019 as well, a representative from Broadcom, Inc. was involved in negotiations with Dr. Case over a new license agreement.

It seems like both of those would potentially be responsive to this interrogatory and document request, but they were not listed.

Unless Your Honor has any other specific questions, I'll wrap it up.

THE COURT: I don't. Thank you.

MS. WEBER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Neukom and Ms. Demers, were you able to reschedule your flight?

I want to talk about scheduling a little bit.

We need to take a break. The court reporter needs a break. I've got some things I have to do. So I need to know what the afternoon is going to look like.

And I want to let you know, we're going to come up with a definition for the SNMP software before we leave today. So however long you all feel like that's going to take, we're going to do that.

MR. NEUKOM: We are all for that, Your Honor.

And thank you for asking about the accommodations.

We were -- I'm the troublemaker. By the way, I'm the reason we're here a week or two later because I e-mailed with, I think, your clerk. Thank you for the reschedule. It allowed my wife and I to take our three kids to Disneyland, which was our first vacation in the COVID era. So I'm sorry to be the scheduling guy at every term.

We've been rebooked. The rebooked flight has me getting home at about midnight and would allow us to stay until --

THE COURT: What time do you need to leave the courthouse?

MR. NEUKOM: That would have us leaving about

2:00. I would ask if it's possible, we're willing to -I think our side of the presentation from the Extreme
side is going to be much, much shorter than what you've
heard so far.

If it would be possible for us to skedaddle by 1:00 or 1:15, I think we might be able to --

THE COURT: If you all can work out that definition. If not, we're going to stay here a while.

MR. NEUKOM: Okay. Well, we've got both flights booked. So if we could get out by 1:00 or 1:15, we can make our original flights, and if not, we'll just do the later ones.

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to talk about this offer or discussions that you all have had concerning at least the simultaneous exchange. We need to address that. So those are going to be the two primary things on the table.

I mean, I'll tell you right now, in looking at the responses, wilfully inadequate under the rule. Willfully.

So I'm going to listen, but I have -- what I have before me, I have no support for any -- to evaluate any arguments concerning why this would be burdensome.

So I've heard the relevance. So now it will be on you all to talk to me about the proportionality. But

we're sitting here today without anything to support 2 that, really. So we need to get discovery going. 3 Happy to address that. And I'm MR. NEUKOM: 4 happy -- well, I was planning to let -- I represent the 5 smallest defendant. THE COURT: We need to take a break. The court 6 reporter needs a break. 7 8 MR. NEUKOM: Okay. 9 THE COURT: And so we're going to have to take 10 some time. So you all tell me. Knowing you need to 11 think about the definition, we have to get that done. 12 So do you want to take an hour? Do you want to 13 take 30 minutes? Or do you all want -- I would like for 14 the parties to be able to do this. But I'm happy to sit 15 here and work through the terms with you. 16 Do you want to go try to get a bite of lunch 17 for 30 minutes and then meet back for 30 minutes and see 18 what you can work out? So there is a full hour. 19 will put us back at 1:00. 20 MR. NEUKOM: That would. I would ask for 30 minutes, if that doesn't -- I don't want to keep 21 22 everybody too tight. But I also -- I have just one idea that I just 23

Okay.

THE COURT:

want to put in the back of the Court's mind over lunch.

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1 MR. NEUKOM: We are also -- just to be clear, 2 Ms. Demers and I represent Extreme Networks, the 3 smallest defendant. 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 MR. NEUKOM: We're the ones accused of 6 having --7 THE COURT: Let me ask you, Ms. Plessman, do 8 you have time restrictions? MS. PLESSMAN: Yes, Your Honor. My flight is 9 10 at 3:00. But I'm happy to reschedule it. I want to 11 give you as much time as you need. 12 THE COURT: Well, I know scheduling flights is 13 not an easy task these days either. So --14 MS. PLESSMAN: I don't know what's available 15 later, but on a break, I'll check and see what I can 16 find. 17 MR. NEUKOM: So here was the idea I had: And 18 this is by no means a joint proposal. This was my 19 private jotting. 20 For Extreme, not only are we the smallest defendant, but there also -- there is only copyright 21 22 claims against Extreme. So I think we all need to confer about this. 23 24 Because there are only copyright claims against 25 Extreme, it is why Ms. Demers and I have been -- one

might say fetishistically focused on getting a copy of the actual registered asserted copyrighted works.

We've got a real chicken and egg situation where each side wants to show -- see the other's source code first or even simultaneous.

My proposal for all of us today and going forward would be as follows: Number one, we would ask for production of the eight registered copyrighted works, attorneys' eyes only, outside counsel only, so that Ms. Demers and my colleagues and I can review it.

Number two, we will commit to this Court that within 20 days of receiving that, we will come back to the defendant -- pardon me -- the plaintiff with an expected production.

Number three, I humbly submit, and I have not conferred with any of my colleagues in the Bar on this, we've got 482 discovery requests from the plaintiff, 64 rogs, 255 RFPs, 164 RFAs, five motions to compel, and we're now two-plus hours into a motion to compel hearing.

I respectfully suggest that the parties retain a discovery master of the Court's choosing. The parties can work out between themselves how to pay for that master, and that master could do a couple of things.

Number one, set the timing for these calls. Number two,

set the duration, and, number three, it would be the discovery master who would certify what is ripe for taking this Court's resources on a motion to compel.

I respectfully think that is a win-win for everybody; although, we have to pay the master fees. And when I say a win-win for everybody, it's for the Court as well so that we don't have multi multi-hour motion to compel hearings.

THE COURT: It's not that I haven't worked through cases like this before. I think we can work through this. But if you all want to have those discussions.

But given that we're running short on time, if you all want to talk about that, fine. Take 30 minutes. We're going to take the full hour. We'll be -- well, it's now short of that. It's 50 minutes. We'll be back here at 1:00 o'clock. Use the time how you wish.

Please work towards getting a definition and have further consultation about the source code because we need to work through that to get your discovery moving.

MR. NEUKOM: Thank you.

THE COURT: And then if you want to think about the responses, let me know. I think I can actually go ahead and rule on those. I will listen. I certainly

1 will. But just based on the rules, they are wilfully 2 inadequate. 3 MR. NEUKOM: Thank you. 4 THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a recess until 1:00. 5 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This 6 7 honorable court stands in recess. 8 (A luncheon recess was taken at 12:11 p.m.) 9 AFTERNOON SESSION 10 (P.M.) 11 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 12 This court is again in session. Please come to order and be seated. 13 14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Neukom. So my 15 computer has gone to sleep during the break, so just one 16 moment. 17 MR. NEUKOM: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 May it please the Court, John Neukom. With me 19 is my colleague, Leslie Demers, for Defendant Extreme 20 Networks. 21 We had some prepared thoughts and remarks, 22 relatively short, but I thought I would try to streamline this a little bit in light of the guidance 23 from the Court that we received before the lunch hour. 24 25 So, by our light, it's important to distinguish

what claims are being asserted against which parties. Extreme is, as I said, the smallest of the defendants. The only claims being asserted against us are copyright infringement. That is in reference to eight specifically-identified, allegedly-registered works and with respect to a handful of products, or I think product families, 11 of them. I am going to --The ones set out in paragraph 49 of THE COURT: the Complaint, those product families? That's right. That's right. MR. NEUKOM: Well, to be perfectly frank with Your Honor, I don't remember if it was paragraph 49. I'm trusting that the Court got that right. So I'm going to shift in just a moment to the Court's suggested guidance of "let's get a definition of SNMP Research software, because I think once we get -at least from our position, if we were to get an agreed-upon definition of that, that would, in a flow-down way, resolve almost all disputes before this Court with respect to Extreme. THE COURT: So are we going to focus on that? MR. NEUKOM: Yeah, I think so. But before I do that, very briefly --

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THE COURT: Oh, certainly.

MR. NEUKOM: -- I wanted to -- I wanted to try to help explain to the Court why this issue has mattered and why what Extreme has been doing has not been stonewalling in any gamesmanship way.

Ms. Demers and I are IP litigators. These are the kinds of cases that we handle. Although, this is my first time in Knoxville. By the way, it's a gorgeous courthouse. I invite you all to the Northern District of California.

THE COURT: We welcome you all to the Eastern District of Tennessee as well.

MR. NEUKOM: If you come to the federal courthouse in San Francisco, you'll see how jealous I am.

We have struggled because -- well, you've heard some comments about the history of the dealings of the parties over time.

As outside counsel for Extreme -- right? -it's our responsibility to evaluate a discovery request
and figure out if it's fair, if it's proportional, if
it's relevant, and what we should be producing or not.

So that's the job that, as officers of the Court, Ms. Demers and I have. It's 18 months after this case has been filed. Again, against our client, the only claim asserted is copyright infringement, and as of

today, I still do not have my eyes on the asserted copyrighted works.

I've struggled with that. This is like asserting a copyright claim over a book but refusing to give the book to the defendant, or a picture, but giving a snippet or a piece of the picture and that's it.

Or I don't know if this Court has been burdened with patent litigation as much as we are in California, but this would be like asserting a patent claim but then refusing to show somebody what the patent is.

Every discovery request that comes in, opposing counsel can all accuse each other of gamesmanship and obstructing and what have you, but one good-faith endeavor is undertaken by the responding party to any discovery requests, which I'm going to look at the discovery request, I'm going to map it to the scope of the claims, possible defenses, and I'm going to make a judgment call about whether this is fair.

As I stand here today, that has been an undoable task at our law firm on behalf of Extreme.

I think what we know is the case today -- although, I can't yet prove it -- is that whatever version of code my client bought from Broadcom/Brocade is not one of the eight asserted copyright registrations. I could be wrong about that. If I am,

as I'm standing before you, I'll be the first to admit it.

So we're going to have some litigation about that, whether this is enough of a modification or a derivation that it's covered by the registrations.

And we'll all have that fight. I'm sure it will be a long one and a fair one when the time comes.

What I am trying to do right now is with a high-technology client that makes switches, which, as you just heard, are not as cheap to buy as a microwave, and with massive, massive libraries of source code, including which is iterative, changing over time, thanks to these engineers, what is appropriate to be produced or not.

And opposing counsel may not be happy with how we have engaged them on this dispute, but it's a pretty darn fair one from our perspective. From outside counsel, if you want me to produce a document, you want me to produce source code from a product that you allege has your copyrighted code, can I see it? Because that's how I'm going to look for it. And we don't have that today.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: They say that the copyright is embedded. Can you not do a search?

They said there is commercial software available to

search for this.

I mean, I don't -- because there is nothing before me, in terms of sworn declarations and affidavits and such, I don't know what the problem is.

MR. NEUKOM: Well, that -- so that actually goes to my proposed definition of SNMP Research software. And you may hear -- I think you're going to hear three different proposals. We really did try.

My proposal from Extreme's perspective is as follows: We define SNMP Research software sequentially. And if I just put the Court to sleep, bear with me. Step one would be as follows: Extreme will produce source code for products which contain a source code that we purchased and received from Brocade. You just heard the transactional history about two hours ago. We will produce that.

At the same time, if the plaintiff will produce to us for the first time ever the complete body of the asserted registered copyrighted works, we can run a search, and if we have any products that have any of those registered copyright versions, we will produce that as well. I believe there are going to be none of those. That would be step one.

Step two, when I said this would be a sequential definition is: Once we actually have a copy

of the copyrights that have been being asserted against us, and once they have the source code for the products that we got from Broadcom/Brocade -- this is going to make everybody moan -- there will need to be a meet and confer, and we're going to have to negotiate on what the search terms or what the search protocols are for additional products.

And I'm not saying that to be cagey. I'm saying that for the exact opposite reason. The way the source code evolves over time -- right? -- all -- at least on the defendants' side, there are armies of engineers. And this source code is iterative. It changes. There are modifications. There are updates. There are complicated numbering schemes and up-versioning all the time.

Now, I could stand here and tell you that I will not produce anything unless it has the exact source code from one of the copyrighted registrations. I love that position. I actually think it's correct on the law. I also understand I'm going to get a lot of screaming from that because this stuff gets modified over time.

THE COURT: Now, even if it -- let me ask this: Even if it's modified, does that embedded copyright not stay with it?

MR. NEUKOM: It depends on how it's modified.

I actually have one factual disagreement with a comment that I heard from Mr. Ashley this morning, my friend at opposing counsel table.

I don't think it's accurate to say that various of these bodies of code when they're versioned up, that it's nothing but indicia.

My understanding for some of the subject matter of this case and just more generally for source code revisions is that is not right. There may, in fact, be deletions and things may be changed in order.

THE COURT: Including an embedded copyright?

MR. NEUKOM: Could be. That's right. Could be deleted. I mean, various portions of this could change over time.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. NEUKOM: I -- God bless me, I am not a source code engineer at Extreme Networks, so I don't do this, but in litigating these cases, that's my understanding.

So if I were to take the position that I am such a generous man, I will agree to produce everything that has one of the eight copyright registered exact versions -- I'm going to get a lot of heat for that, but if they give us their registrations and I give them the

source code for the products that we bought, which is how we got dragged into this lawsuit, then here is what's going to happen: They're going to show up at the meet and confer, and they're going to say, "I want you to search for everything that has the words" -- I bet the Court has seen this when we're negotiating over search terms for e-mails; right? They will say, "I want any e-mail with the word 'and'." And I'll say, "I disagree. I'd like a boolean term with AT connectors with everything within 20 words." They're going to design the search term which will come up with everything. The defendant will propose a search term that comes up with nothing.

What I think needs to happen here is: After we actually get their copyrighted works, which Ms. Demers and I would really like to see, they get some of our -- the source code for the products that they accuse that we bought and thereby started copyright infringement. Let's exchange that. Counsel will look at it and retained experts will look at the source code as well.

Then we're going to have a negotiation about what the appropriate search term would be. So that they have accused of us of copyright infringement and they would like to see things which are modifications, slight

variations on code that they assert they own. Whether it's on unregistered work that was given to us by Brocade or whether it's one of the asserted works in this case, we'll have that discussion.

The meeting and conferring in this case has been frustrating on all sides. You have just heard two hours of frustration from the plaintiffs' side. I can assure you it's been in good faith and with quite a bit of frustration on the defense side as well.

I don't impugn everything for that. That's the adversarial process. But if we can do that, once we're all looking at the same code, I think either we can agree to a reasonable search or not. And if we don't, we can bring it to this Court or -- my read on the room was my discovery master suggestion didn't go over very well. So I'm happy to drop that. But that would at least be a narrow dispute.

Now, I think what you're going to hear from my other friends on the other side of the podium is that's not right. Instead, we should just have to go look for SNMP code because we should be able to find it and identify it.

The problem for me is as follows: I started by talking -- and I don't think I've ever done this -- about the fact that Ms. Demers and I have a special role

here as outside counsel. We're not source code engineers. We're not inhouse counsel of the company. In order for us to be signing our name to pleadings or to discovery answers and to be making representations about what we have or haven't found, and to be doing that in an imprecise definition of, it came from Dr. Case, it came from this wonderful company in Tennessee, that puts us in a pretty rotten position because I don't know how I can make that representation in any reliable way.

Instead, after each side exchanges, we're all looking at the same source code. We then negotiate.

Not whether something is actionable because it hasn't been modified enough or -- or isn't actionable because it has. Let's treat it as -- let's treat it as source code, as it were, like it's an e-mail repository, and negotiate search terms. And then they will know exactly what they are and are not getting because it either hit on the search term or it didn't.

I will be able to make a representation that

I'm not going to get accused of later on that we ran the

terms through the appropriate repositories with the

agreed-upon terms and that's what came up.

So I know that's not a silver bullet for a definition, but it seems workable to me. And just to

summarize, before I sit down, because I did promise the Court I'd be the fastest one today, number one, we will give them the source code for the products that we inherited, or purchased, rather, from Broadcom/Brocade, and if that same source code persisted over numerous versions of the product, they will get that as well.

They will not get, as an initial matter, modifications. And the reason I don't think they get modifications is for two things: Number one, it's a slippery slope for us. Number two, it puts me back in that untenable position of looking through source code and try to predict what SNMP would or wouldn't call its own. Number two -- or 1-B, if you will, because I think it should happen at the same time, they finally show us the copyrighted works that they have sued us on. Number three, we then have maybe a disagreeable, but at least a transparent, or apparent, as the case may be, discussion about what the further searching steps would be for what would or wouldn't come in.

To be clear, I bet that process is going to have me producing more source code for more products than we will later at summary judgment or a trial be anywhere close to admitting are covered by the claims against us, but that's -- if done with proportionality and with an eye towards burden, that's fine. That's

part of the discovery process. But it at least gets us transparency.

I have about 52 other comments that I'm itching to make to the Court, but I'm going to pass the podium over to Ms. Plessman, who represents Broadcom/Brocade, and I'm happy to address any questions from the Court about what I hope is a practical solution.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. NEUKOM: Thank you.

MS. PLESSMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. PLESSMAN: As he said, my name is Allison Plessman, and I represent defendants Broadcom, Inc. and Brocade in this case.

I think there is a lot to unpack here, and I'm not going to be able to refute every point. And this isn't an argument on the merits; although, suffice it to say, there are some things I agree with from defendant -- or from plaintiffs and there are some things that we disagree with, and I'm not going to be able do that unless I spend the next five hours. So I'm not going to do that.

But I do think it's important to put a few things, a few background points into context so you know where we are coming from.

First of all, as defendants have explained to plaintiffs many times, Defendant Broadcom, Inc. is a parent holding company. It's not an operating company. It doesn't have employees and it doesn't have products. So a lot of our responses to the requests are based on that because that's just a fact. And they seem unwilling to accept that, but unfortunately that's just the case. Its subsidiaries and affiliates, though, include approximately 150 separate entities around the world; one of which is Brocade.

And the SEC filings and publicly-available documents, which plaintiffs have equally available to them, show that Broadcom, Inc. did not acquire Brocade until after Brocade's divestiture in October 2017.

Broadcom acquired Brocade in November. So that's also a source of contention, but it's publicly available. They know that to be the case, and yet they still ask for things like all documents relating to the merger, the acquisition of Broadcom of Brocade.

That can't be relevant. And the problem with talking about this at a high level, you know, these categories, yes, could some documents relating to Broadcom's acquisition of Brocade be relevant? Yes. Could some documents relating to the divestiture of Extreme be relevant to the extent it pertains to SNMP?

Of course.

But their request asked for all documents relating to these very broad topics, and that's when you really start to break it down. And then on top of it in each of these requests -- now, I can see if you're not Broadcom and Brocade where we're fixed on this definitional issue. You start to get -- as you look through the response, you just see Brocade and Broadcom and it looks like it's targeted to those defendants.

Behind -- and the same with SNMP Research. You assume -- Research software. You assume it must just be the software in the Complaint.

But when you keep going back to the defined entities and the defined software, you realize that every single request is sucking in 150 entities as if they're parties to the litigation. And that is the problem. So not only are they overbroad seeking all documents relating to these broad categories, but they're applying those requests to 150 entities.

So I think that those threshold issues, if we can get to those definitional issues and just focus on the software that's at issue in the Complaint, the entities that are actual defendants, we will move so much faster.

THE COURT: And I think an appropriate response

in that sort of situation would -- instead of just an objection that it's overbroad would be state what you have. These are the ones relevant to SNMP. We have other documents, but they are outside the scope of those dealing with this particular issue because we have 150. Go about it in the reverse.

MS. PLESSMAN: So let's -- let's talk about the withholding issue because it kind of touches on that.

THE COURT: Because the rule does require that.

If they're withheld, you have to state that there are

documents being withheld. So I would like to --

MS. PLESSMAN: Yeah, and I understand that.

And this is the way that -- and, actually, if you look at plaintiffs' reply brief, they actually point to language in the advisory committee that we believe applies and makes sense.

And I think if you -- if we use an example from how plaintiffs themselves did it -- I know we haven't filed a motion to compel first, but I think just for illustration purposes, it shows that our response actually is more helpful.

So the way that we interpret that, there is an advisory committee note that says that if you provide the limits of the boundaries of what you're producing, then that qualifies as to what you're withholding.

So what we do is: We say, "Here is our objections, but we will produce non-privileged documents." So we're not producing the ones that are subject to the privilege objections, you know, from this date to this date. So that brings in the time frame. For Brocade, Inc. We're construing it to apply only to Brocade, Inc.

So, in our response, we are providing the limits. That's how we construe that rule. Now, I defer to Your Honor exactly how to do it, but we weren't doing it in bad faith.

So let me -- let me just compare what plaintiffs have done. First of all, they don't say they're withholding documents on an objection-by-objection basis. What they do is: They list -- they have a laundry list of objections, and at the end, they say, "But we're withholding documents." And then they say, "But we're also producing them."

And so in meet and confers, I said, "Well, what objections are you withholding? What are you producing?" And they say, "Well, we don't actually know what we're withholding. We haven't done the search yet. We don't know the categories of documents. Like you said, we" -- you know, "This is a huge case. We're doing all this review. We don't know exactly what could

possibly be withheld."

So it's meaningless that way. Whereas, the way that we're doing, we're trying to provide the boundaries of exactly what we're willing to produce so that we can have a meaningful meet and confer.

So that's why we thought that the way that we were doing it was actually the spirit of the rule. That was the purpose, to help somebody understand, "Okay.

You have these objections, but what are you agreeing to produce?"

So that's the way that we approached it. And, again, you know, if you have a --

THE COURT: I'm still at a loss as to why there have been, I guess since last summer, four meet and confers and we're still here and nothing has been -- I don't -- I don't understand.

MS. PLESSMAN: Yeah, let me talk about that.

So, I think it is important to go through kind of the chronology. And I'm not going to belabor every point. And I agree. I don't -- I don't want to impugn anybody. You know, but I do think it's -- you've got to do a little finger pointing.

THE COURT: I don't -- I don't want to impugn.

I want to understand so we can get to the core problem and get you all moving.

MS. PLESSMAN: So let me explain a little bit.

So, Your Honor issued the ruling in June 2019, basically saying, meet and confer on these requests, you know, and there had been a period of time where we were in a standstill. So we did. We immediately tried to meet and confer. But we were focused on the issue of that Interrogatory No. 1. And we barely met and conferred about any of the others, and there are several requests that we didn't even meet and confer about.

But once we reach an agreement that we were going to limit our response to the items in paragraph 64, they wanted us to respond to that as soon as possible to get the ball rolling.

So we said, "Okay. We're going to try to do that in a month." It was a lot of information to compile. So we got to the end of the month and they said -- and, again, we didn't confer about a lot of responses that you said that we should. The plan, in my mind, was that we would, but we were trying to get that initial response that all of the other requests are tied to.

So we say -- you know, we get to the end of the month and we say, "We need a little bit more time."

Instead of waiting or asking or talking and -- they just filed a motion which they later withdrew. So that whole

month we are then responding to the motion and trying to supplement our response.

And so we supplemented our responses, as the parties agreed, and later they didn't like that agreement, and, fine, I'll get to that. But we were spending both our time responding to the motion, trying to supplement, and then we said in a number of responses that you have before you, you know, we'll agree to meet and confer, referring back to Your Honor's order because we had not yet met and conferred about them.

So, I understand from your perspective, it might look like -- you know, if we were just looking at it for the first time and there wasn't that history, we're just saying we'll meet and confer. But the reason for that is because we hadn't yet done it in response to your order. There were several topics that just didn't come up at all.

So we get to the supplemental response. We thought we did it exactly as agreed. They don't like, for example, that we agreed to limit it to the paragraphs in 64. But Broadcom didn't respond to those paragraphs -- or for those products.

Well, the reason Broadcom didn't respond for those products is because it doesn't sell products. It doesn't sell the products in 64.

THE COURT: Was that discussed at the meet and confer?

MS. PLESSMAN: Oh, yes, yes, yes. Yes, they know that. We've gone over that many, many times.

And that's true for a lot of the Broadcom responses. We repeat over and over again, well, they're not selling products in Tennessee. They're not selling products here. They're not -- they're not involved in the marketing and advertising of products. They don't have employees. So I don't really know how much more we can provide on that topic.

And the problem with the meet and confer since then, and even before then, the way that they went, it was very much in the vein of, "We don't have to compromise at all because we think just on these broad topics, they're relevant; so we're not going to compromise at all." And I was approaching it, and I think Extreme was approaching it as, this is the starting point. There is some requests that were just facially overbroad. Look at these definitions applying to 150 companies.

We can get to a point where we agree, but when you're trying to negotiate with somebody that is just saying, "This is it. This is the way it's going to be," it's very difficult.

So we did reach some agreement, and as I said, we agreed to produce documents responsive to dozens of requests. And to this point, we have -- I think we have collected from 34 custodians that we think are most relevant or likely to be relevant to this case. It's over 5 million documents already just with those. But it has nothing to do with the 150 companies that have nothing to do with this litigation.

It takes time. Most of those documents are going to be irrelevant. This is actually a pretty straightforward case. But in order to do, like, a reasonably diligent search, we cast a wide net. We're not trying to delay or hide documents, or, you know, get around our discovery obligations. We know we're going to have to produce documents relating to the contract with Brocade and communications about it and that sort of thing.

But what we don't want to do is take this -- it can't be a fishing expedition. And just as an example, when we were talking about how to limit the SNMP Research software definitions, I think that is the easiest issue from my perspective.

From my perspective, it should just be the software that's listed in Table 1 and the software that Brocade received under the license agreement. And what

I added, and when we were conferring over the lunch break, was that if they're concerned that we may have made modifications, we can add that into the definition, any modifications that Brocade might have made.

And I explained that the problem with expanding it beyond that is, for one, if it wasn't registered, then it's not going to be the subject of a copyright infringement claim anyway. So what else is there? And if it wasn't provided to Brocade under the license agreement, then it's not relevant to the breach of contract claim.

So it seems like why -- why can't we just agree that that's the relevant software? And then they're saying, well -- and then the additional point is: We don't know whether your predecessor or subsidiaries or employees created some software, what the name of it is, whether there is a subsidiary in Venezuela who, you know, might have had some agreement, and how would we even find that? And why is that relevant at all because it might have been a perfectly legal agreement that has nothing to do with the case? Or, at the very least, if you think there is software, like, that aren't -- that isn't in that -- you know, the copyright registered -- the registration listed in the Complaint or the software provided under the license agreement,

list it for us. Tell us the names of the software.

It's their software. Tell us what you want us to look for.

But, instead, you know, they want to just have this undefined third category of software that they have created that they won't tell us what it is, what it's named. You know, it's like a catchall that's unnecessary because it necessarily wouldn't have anything to do with the allegations in the Complaint. We're focused on the copyrighted works and the license agreement software.

So I really just don't understand why that's an issue. We've talked about it. I've tried to explain that issue over and over and over again in the meet and confers and it just has gone nowhere.

And what's most troubling is what I heard over the lunch break because we said, "We don't have any reason to believe" -- "There are a couple entities that have license agreements with SNMP that, you know, are not at issue," and they said, "They will be excluded." And we said, "We don't have any reason to believe that anybody, any of the other 150 entities have it."

But for us, when you're responding to discovery, when you actually make them part of the definition, it makes them, in effect, parties to the

litigation. "In order for us to verify, what do you want us to do?" And Mr. Ashley suggested that we would have to search the source code of all products of all 150 entities to prove a negative. And that is exactly the problem; right? If we could just represent -- you know, we can informally represent and say, "Hey, we're not aware of anything. Do you have any reason to believe this?"

But when you're putting it in a discovery response, what are you having to do? Are you having to review all these products, the source code of everything? Are you collecting documents from 150 entities and then applying, you know, how many search terms against millions and millions of documents?

It just doesn't make sense because the claims in this case are not related to Brocade disclosing the software to their affiliates. And if they really wanted to just know that, even though I would say it's irrelevant, but at this point, we would be willing to answer it, they could have served a discovery request saying, "To which affiliates did Brocade," you know, "disclose the software that it received under the license agreement?" And we would say none because it's focused on Brocade. It's not just asking about all 150 entities and what they're doing and putting them on the

spot and making Brocade answer on behalf of those 150 entities.

And they're doing that throughout. You know, even to the extent for the -- there are requests, for example, asking for all financial documents for a certain period of time from all 150 entities.

That's -- I have never seen anything like that.

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And so when you -- when you read their requests, you really have to make sure that you -- when you see Broadcom and Brocade and you see SNMP Research software, that you refer back to the defined terms, and then it becomes very, very clear how facially overbroad it is. It's difficult to even -- there has been a lot of talk about burden and showing, you know, what -- showing undue burden. But the 150 entities is the initial threshold burden because in order to even get to those more exact burden calculations, you would have to -- you would have to do this crazy search of 150 entities.

So what I think makes sense, you just -- the entities should be the defendants, Broadcom, Inc., Brocade, and then if you want to add in predecessors because there is this issue with Broadcom, Limited, fine. But there is no reason to add all the entities.

And then they think you can have reasonable

discussions about burden and whether or not it makes sense and how to limit the requests because then you're actually talking on a reasonable scale. It's easy to -- it's easier to assess the burden in the first place; right? We can go to our 34 custodians, which I think is a lot of custodians for a case like this. We were being very generous in applying, you know, what is and what is not potentially relevant.

Then you can say, "Okay. Well, if you're asking for" -- whatever -- "all documents relating to the merger, we can start running search terms to see how many numbers come up against those documents."

But to do that against 150 entities as a starting point, that's just -- we've got to get past that as the threshold point, so that then we can have the meaningful meet and confers.

And this is an issue that we've talked about so much in the meet and confers, and then we've spent very little time at all on the actual substance of the request.

And, frankly, we were surprised when they filed the latest motion to discover because there is still a lot of issues to work out, and I feel like the parties could meaningfully compromise if there was any desire to compromise, or any belief that they need to, and they're

coming at it from a place where they don't need to move at all because they're the plaintiffs and there is this very broad concept of relevance, which I don't dispute, but it is not without bounds. And what we're dealing with right now is a fishing expedition.

So when we have these meet and confers, I will tell you that what we've heard today is the most detailed explanation I've ever heard through any of these hours on the meet-and-confer calls.

When I've asked, "Well, what's the reason why you need this," or X, Y, I've gotten, "There are reasons. We might have other claims. They" -- you know, "One of these entities may have received it for" -- "software from someone." Those aren't -- those aren't reasons. And it's very difficult to meet and confer when you're hearing those sorts of --

THE COURT: You did not have an in-person meeting. This is not the first time, first case I've heard these sorts of matters. It's very helpful when you get in the same room and you do hear each other.

MS. PLESSMAN: Yeah. You know what? And I'm fine with that, and I do feel like this is -- I do feel like if we can get through this defined term issue, and I just feel very strongly that this is not complicated. It should just be the parties to the case and it should

be software that's at issue in the Complaint. I don't even know why that's a dispute. I really don't. The only reason that they possibly want to expand it is because they might have other claims, and that's just not good enough.

What I think makes more sense is: First you limit it to the parties in the case and the software in the case, and then as we produce these documents, if there is something in the discovery they receive that triggers something, they're, like, "Ooh, this is a problem," or, "Oh, now we need more about this," well, then you have that discussion. Then you issue more discovery responses. Then you expand it; you have that talk. But you don't start with 150 entities.

I've just never seen anything like that. So that's -- I mean, I think that there is a lot to go through. And I can explain a lot more, but I do believe that -- and I don't want to leave anything -- what I don't want is to leave and then not have addressed a specific request and then have to, you know, have some really burdensome or a bunch of -- produce a bunch of irrelevant documents because I didn't address it today, but my firm belief is that if we can come -- if we can start with the parties to the case and the software at issue in the Complaint, we can produce documents much

more quickly. We can get to that next stage if there is additional documents, if we need to expand it. And if there is really, like, an entity that they are really concerned about, we would consider adding that, but not 150. And then I think -- and then we're moving. And then we can come back on -- you know, on targeted requests, saying this one is a problem even with the -- you know, even with the terms narrowed, or, you know, we haven't been able to reach consensus on this; that kind of thing.

And I don't -- I don't have a problem with that sort of phased approach, necessarily. What I do have a problem with, though, is that when the parties reach an agreement, and even if it's preliminary, and we follow that agreement and then being told, "Well, they're playing" -- "It's shell games. They're being disingenuous," because we just did what we agreed to.

We -- nobody ever said that's the only, that's all we'll ever produce.

Like, for Interrogatory 1, we never said that we wouldn't provide additional information or that we would only limit it to paragraph 64. What we said is, like, "Well, why don't we just limit it to Brocade, just the one entity and just the software at issue and then just frame the interrogatory that way?"

And, again, I may be -- maybe I'm seeing it the wrong way, but, to me, that just seems very reasonable, at least as a starting point, and then, you know, if other things come out of discovery -- and they have got a lot of requests, so if there is another problem, they're going to see it. They're very good lawyers.

They are going to identify it. They can give a targeted request. But I just -- I think you've got to have a starting point that's more reasonable. Otherwise, it's just too much. We're already at 5 million documents.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PLESSMAN: Do you have any questions that you want me to address on the other topics? I know there were several.

THE COURT: No, I want to try to get to some productive conversations on where we go from today before you all need to leave.

So it seems like it would be a very reasonable starting point to start the production with the parties and with the products listed in the Complaint. That sounds very reasonable. And then it seems that could be done -- it should be done quickly. This has been pending for quite a while.

Then you could look -- and I'm just talking out loud at the moment. I'll hear your comments about it

and what issues may arise. But that does sound very reasonable.

And then as you do look through things, it's not saying that that's the end of it. I understand that there may be — there may be more claims. You're entitled to the discovery to pursue that. But, at this point — and I would like to hear your comments on the 150 entities. I'm not sure at this point, based on what I know today, where that will go, but it does make — it does make sense that, go ahead and start with what we have with Broadcom and then see what you get.

Mr. Wood.

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, can we have three minutes to caucus among ourselves before we move on?

MR. NEUKOM: While we do that, may I make one request for clarification before my friends caucus?

THE COURT: If you all would pause for just a minute and see if his request may impact your discussions.

MR. WOOD: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NEUKOM: This is somebody's paper.

I wrote down what you said. It makes sense to me. I just wanted to make one beating-of-a-dead-horse request that we add to that the production from the

plaintiff of the source code for the copyright registration.

THE COURT: And I do want you all to talk about that because I've heard your request, which is -- it seems to me you're intertwining the definition of what we're looking at along with this copyright, and --

MR. NEUKOM: Well, okay. I think I am. Sorry, I didn't mean to talk over the Court.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.

MR. NEUKOM: I only represent Extreme. Against Extreme, there is no breach of contract or license claim.

I think the issue gets -- I think Ms. Plessman could advocate on the implications of that better than I ever could.

But from Extreme's perspective, given that the only claim is copyright infringement, Your Honor heard how boring Ms. Demers and my law practice is. We really need to see that code to understand the scope of the case.

So I don't intend to be asking for anything controversial. With the products listed in the Complaint for the parties who are named to the suit, I just wanted to respectfully ask if we could add to that, also. Could we please get those --

1 THE COURT: The code. 2 MR. NEUKOM: Not the code source deposits that 3 went to the Copyright Office, which is just like the 4 first 25 and last 25 pages; the whole shebang, the 5 copyrighted work. 6 So, to use my analogy before, if we're accused 7 of ripping off a book, we would sure love a copy of that 8 book. THE COURT: Well, in your discussions, please 9 10 take that request into account. And then we'll take a 11 five-minute recess and come back and see where we are. 12 MR. NEUKOM: Thank you. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 13 14 honorable court stands in recess. 15 (A brief recess was taken.) 16 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This court is 17 again in session. Please come to order and be seated. 18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wood. 19 MR. WOOD: So I wanted to address with Your Honor about starting the production and then very 20 quickly want to go to the definition of SNMP Research 21 software, see if we can get some resolution on that --22 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. WOOD: -- hopefully. So we are -- we 25 completely agree with Your Honor. We think that's a

great place to start, with the production, the products that are listed. That's what we've been trying to get for a while. That was our initial proposal -- call it a compromise -- that we made with the parties to kind of get things rolling.

We just want to be clear that that is all versions of the products. Not just the ones that existed in 2017 or 2019, but all the versions we've asked for. And we've asked for a limited period of time, so --

THE COURT: So the products listed in the Complaint and all versions of those specific products?

MR. WOOD: Correct.

THE COURT: So it will be the source code for those specific things?

MR. WOOD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOOD: And I just want to -- I think it's helpful. This is just on that point because my understanding of Mr. Neukom's proposal is that they only provide what was existing in 2017, or -- actually, I think what he said was, "We're only going to give you what we got from Brocade." Not, "We're going to give you what's in our products," which, as we've explained, is what we really need to see.

1 And I had -- so, Document No. 98, which is an 2 e-mail that -- and it's Exhibit C to the Weber 3 declaration. So it's an e-mail from Extreme, actually, 4 to me with -- describing what they have. There is an 5 attachment to that e-mail, and we didn't put it in the record just because we felt like it was a lot of detail 6 7 and maybe Extreme's confidential information. But I 8 think it's informative for what we're doing here. 9 If I can, I'd like to pass one up to Your 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. Yes, you may. 12 MR. WOOD: So this is the --13 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Wood. The phone 14 line disconnected. I guess I'm not -- we're going to 15 see if we can get him back on. 16 (A brief recess was taken.) 17 THE COURT: Okay. Sorry, Mr. Wood. Go ahead. 18 MR. WOOD: So this is the attachment that 19 Extreme sent us showing all their SKUs that contained 20 SNMP Research and how many shipped by year. So they determined in 2020, that they had shipments of products 21 with SNMP up through 2020, and it's our belief that that 22 has continued. 23 24 The other point I would point out, in terms of 25 the second page, if you look at the products at the end,

you notice that some of those didn't even start distributing until 2020, which means they were putting it in new SKUs. So the 9150 has some in 2019, and then some of the SKUs didn't even ship until 2020.

So they have our software. They know they have it. To only give us what was existing in 2017 really doesn't -- is not really even a start because they are -- they already know and they have given us a chart that shows that.

And these are the products that are listed in the Complaint, the ones on this -- the ones here (indicating). So they were able to do it with a lot of detail.

And I'd like to show -- while I only have one of these, I think I can show it on the ELMO and then maybe everyone can see it because it actually has source code.

So this is another -- this is an e-mail from

Extreme, and our request was what -- they had an issue

with some source code, and that's the reason this

has -- because it actually has SNMP Research source code

in it. So we're trying to keep that confidential.

But if you notice, Ms. Sipes from Extreme

Networks, she says this is the version and this is the copyright screen out of their source code.

So your question to Mr. Neukom was, "Why can't you just look at the copyright string?" Well, that's exactly what they did back in 2018 when this -- when this first started. They looked and said, "Hey, this is what we're using. It's right here in the source code."

And it's not clear why Mr. Neukom wouldn't know about this. This has been -- I mean, it's their e-mail and/or any other counsel, or why he couldn't have inquired of their engineers to figure it out.

The other thing I wanted to comment on goes to this exact same point. His analogy that it's like suing someone for a book and you don't have a book. They have the book. This is proof that they have the book.

What they don't have is the copy of the book that we filed with the Copyright Office. That's all they're asking for. They have the book. They know exactly what the book says. They can read the book, and they can tell which products have the book in it, you know, have our software in it.

So, I mean, to us, it's just not -- it's just not credible that they don't know what's going on because we've got all this information in front of us.

THE COURT: Okay. At the beginning of your argument, Mr. Ashley said there had been an offer for the simultaneous exchange, and it would be you would

give them the source code. What exactly does that mean? 2 MR. WOOD: So that's the copy of the source 3 code that was actually registered with the Copyright 4 Office. So that's what they have. 5 So in order to do an infringement 6 analysis -- so to know you have the software should not 7 be an issue because you have the book. You can see what's in the book. 8 9 To do an infringement analysis, you need to see exactly what was registered with the Copyright Office, 10 11 and you'd get an expert and they will compare what was 12 registered at the Copyright Office to what's in the 13 product. That's what we need to do to prove our case. 14 That's what they're going to do to try and defend the 15 case. And we both want to do that at the same time. 16 So we're fine, also, you know, if they will 17 produce -- they're going to produce all the source code 18 for all their products --19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. WOOD: We're fine with it at the same time 21 so our experts can start at the same time and we have 22 all the same information. What we don't want is --23 24 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WOOD: -- we don't get anything, they do an

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infringement analysis, and inevitably they come back and 2 say it doesn't exactly match, or there is some defense 3 and we're right back in front of you. So that's where 4 we think your proposal --5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. WOOD: -- we're completely in --7 THE COURT: So you do not have any issue with 8 the copyright Mr. Neukom has requested for the 9 simultaneous exchange? 10 MR. WOOD: We don't have any issue with that. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 MR. WOOD: So that, I think -- hopefully that 13 resolves that issue. 14 THE COURT: Well, let me ask this question. 15 MR. WOOD: Okay. 16 THE COURT: So I think that would be the most 17 reasonable thing is to schedule the simultaneous 18 exchange. So we need to have a very specific date by 19 which to do that. 20 So I do not know how long that it would take 21 for you to get your copyright information. It seems 22 like it wouldn't take very long to get the source code 23 from at least the versions in the Complaint. It does 24 make sense that it would go for future versions because

something has been shown that it still includes the

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source code. So all that makes sense.

So I need a time estimate to put in the order. Not an estimate, I need a date. So I need to know what you estimate so I can decide on a date.

So let me start by -- so, okay.

MS. PLESSMAN: I'm so sorry. I think that because Extreme -- what Extreme -- and Broadcom and Brocade might be a little bit different. Do you mind if I just --

THE COURT: No, come up. I want to take all that into account because I want one date.

MS. PLESSMAN: Are you finished or --

MR. WOOD: I'm done with that. I still want to address the SNMP Research software, but I can do that after we address this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry.

MS. PLESSMAN: Okay. So, just to give you a little bit of background on the source code and some of the source of confusion about the requests and what exactly has to be provided and when, we agree with Mr. Neukom that the initial phase -- and we proposed this last summer, and as Mr. Ashley said, this could have been done very quickly if they had just agreed, and there is really no dispute that that software that was registered with the Copyright Office has to be provided.

So there is no dispute about that, and we think that's the first step.

But with respect to the requests for source code and other requests that are sort of related, there is a lot of confusion in the way that they frame the request. And we've talked about this in meet and confers, but it continues to be a problem.

They talk about needing the source code for all versions of all releases of the products, of all products that are listed in this paragraph.

But the way that the SNMP -- so just stepping back, and as Mr. Ashley said, there is the SNMP protocol, which it's been around for decades and, as you said, it basically helps devices on a network to communicate with each other. That is not SNMP Research. Plaintiffs, they don't own that. That's a protocol. There are several, many, many different implementations. Their implementation is one of them.

And, in fact, the -- Brocade has now replaced the SNMP implementation with a free open source implementation available on the internet.

So that's what we're talking about. We're talking about an implementation of an SNMP protocol for which there are many and now they're freely available on the internet. Just to -- and I think that's important

for the proportionality point because what we're talking about here is the code on -- we're really not talking about the products. We're talking about the software that's in the products, and the software is part of an operating system.

The SNMP portion, when it was on Brocade's operating system -- and there is no dispute about that because we got it under the license agreement -- it was a tiny fraction of Brocade's overall operating system.

So when they asked for new versions of different releases of the products, I think what they're really saying, which we've tried to understand, is that they're talking about versions of the operating system and how it's changed over time and the SNMP portions of that.

And so what we have said is that it might make sense -- again, I think there is that initial phase to make sure that the copyrights were actually registered because that's a prerequisite to filing a copyright infringement claim. So the case should never have been brought if the codes don't match.

And one of the issues, as you mentioned, was at a meet and confer, they did admit that the version that was provided to us wasn't registered. So there is serious concerns about that.

You can't say in a Complaint that it was registered and then have that not be true, and then go through and have the situation where Brocade is giving its entire operating code when the SNMP portion is a tiny fraction -- and those are the crown jewels of Brocade's entire business, the non-SNMP portion -- when we might have a situation where the copyright infringement claim should never have been brought.

And that's why we're so concerned about that initial phase, which, again, Mr. Ashley said could happen very quickly.

But then with respect to the actual exchange of source code, what -- what we don't want to have is in that initial exchange where they provide that copyright exchange, we're providing our entire operating system.

What we want to do is provide the -- you know, the software that we actually received under the -- under the agreement to see if they're the same; to just do an initial comparison to make sure that this is a claim that should have been brought.

It's not -- they said it's an entire infringement analysis, but they also said that that could happen very quickly and that there should be no doubt, and, you know, we'll understand very quickly that that was, in fact, registered.

But that's what we've been proposing, just to have that check that we aren't -- based on their own representations in the meet and confers and the fact that our version is not listed in the Table 1 of the Complaint, I think that's an entirely reasonable proposal just to make sure that what we're talking about is onboard; right? That we're not just opening up the entire operating system, which is massive, and has nothing to do with SNMP.

And the other issue for us is: We're not talking about -- there is a lot of talking about copying and that they need to be able to compare lines of code. That's not the case for us. This isn't a case where, say, an employee was working for a company and they took the source code and then they put it in their new company's software. Now you have to try to find it somewhere in their software and try to determine whether or not it was copied and stolen. They know; we all know that we had the software. We know where it is.

They even said, and we've -- we acknowledged it, too, there is -- there are files that are specific to SNMP. We don't use it anymore, but in the -- when we did, there are SNMP files that can be isolated. There is no reason to provide the entire code, especially at this first stage when we're still -- we still need to

verify that this is a claim that should even be here.

So that's our position on that. Do you have any questions?

THE COURT: Not at the moment.

MR. NEUKOM: Once again, I'll try to be brief. I heard the Court's suggestion. Look, as an initial point, I hope part of what's been going on for the last year might be coming clear to the Court that it's not necessarily -- it's that negotiating these issues, especially with repositories, is tricky stuff. And I'm sure it's not the first time this Court has adjudicated a source code fight.

For the suggestion that we produce all source code for all products across all time, so long as they track one of the 11 named product families in the Complaint, I intended to say yes to show the Court how reasonable I am, but there is a practical issue there.

Look, as an initial matter, the projector showing -- which Mr. Wood showed us, which at least took me back to high-school math, and I enjoyed it, the version talked -- that was mentioned there, 16.2.0.9, isn't one of the copyrighted works, but you've heard that from me before.

Secondly, I think that we're doing Tara Flanagan, a lawyer in California, who at the time was

inhouse at Extreme, a little bit of a disservice in this courtroom. The Court may hear about this another day, maybe, further down the road, but my client has been trying to negotiate a license for this stuff for quite a while. And in the context of those pre-suit negotiations, she had an open line of communication with counsel for SNMP.

The idea that in a pre-suit, if not even settlement communication, that a counsel would say, "Here is a big list of product SKUs that trace to our acquisition from the Broadcom business unit, which the lawyers said have SNMP code," that is very, very different than outside counsel in a federal courtroom making representations about whether asserted code is in a product or not.

All of that said, my concern is more of a practical one. If we are talking about us producing source code for that many products across a five-year period of time, I'm actually concerned about the burden for all of us. That would be -- I want to be very clear. I'm not making a representation to the Court because I don't know the quantity of source code trees we're talking about. I believe that would be an obscene quantity of data to be hosting on a secure non-network machine for source code review by parties and their

experts.

It's for that reason -- and this is the last time I'll make this suggestion, and if it doesn't get traction, I won't raise it again. My thought would be to start with the initial round of products that the -- and they did not misrepresent me. My thought was: They give us the copyright registrations. We give them the source code for the products as we acquired them.

Once counsel and experts on both sides are equally equipped with that same set of information, then we have a meet and confer about what kind of searches can be run to see which other source code versions should be fair game for this case.

So, on that point -- I mean, to be fair, to be very, very clear, of course, if this Court orders that you want us to produce all source code for all of those products, we will, of course, do that. If you ask me the date on which to do that, I think it might be -- we might need, like, 40 days because of the quantity of terabits, gigabits at issue.

But I intend not to be hiding the ball with my idea that we make that initial, more-limited production. I intend that to be a more practical solution. We'll get it over to them. You've heard me riff on this before. They will ask us to search everything that has

the word "and." We'll say, "Only with 92 boolean points." We will negotiate and come to some agreed-upon search. I think that is going to be far, far more practical for the parties.

Thank you for the Court's time.

THE COURT: So if the future versions are not considered and it's just the ones listed in the Complaint, what would that time estimate be?

MR. NEUKOM: Well, I'm in danger of getting in trouble because my client's not here. But I can tell you that either Ms. Demers and I would make sure that was produced in 20 days, or, if not, we would offer the Court a good-cause affidavit explaining to you why we couldn't meet the 20-day deadline and asking for the Court's mercy.

But I just want to make sure that the client doesn't have a source code repository issue or something. But I can tell you from our part, that's what we can commit to giving you our best efforts on.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEUKOM: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WOOD: So, in the Complaint, we've listed

the products. We haven't listed versions. And then we asked them to identify everything that has it, which they haven't done. So that's why we're asking -- I mean, we're asking for all versions across the time period.

I'd like to point out that, you know, this has been pending -- this request has been pending since, I think, December of 2020, and --

THE COURT: This first step should have been done a long time ago.

MR. WOOD: And Extreme has not submitted or Brocade/Broadcom has not submitted anything to explain the burden of doing this.

I believe Mr. Neukom prefaced his comment about obscene quantity with he doesn't really know, and he said before, he really doesn't even know what's in the software. He doesn't -- I mean, it's pure speculation. There is nothing before Your Honor to show that there is -- there is any burden.

So, I think with that, we should move forward with Your Honor's proposal, and, you know, we can meet any of those time frames with our production. Whatever Your Honor thinks is reasonable. 20 days, 40 days. We can do it quicker than 20 days if we need to. And I'd be glad to answer any other questions.

I do feel like I need to respond to one thing Ms. Plessman said, continue or a frame that somehow we represented that it wasn't registered. That's not what we said. I think Mr. Ashley addressed that in his opening, but I think I can continue to use Mr. Neukom's book analogy. It's the equivalent -- when we registered -- when SNMP, when Dr. Case registers Version 16, he's registering all the code that he has. It's all one version.

When code is shipped to a particular entity, they get a subset of that code. And so when we register, we're registering the entire book. They have chapters 1 through 3. And what they keep saying is, "Show us where you registered" -- "your registration says chapters 1, 2 and 3." And we say, "Well, we've registered it in the book." Then they're like, "Well, then, you didn't register chapters 1, 2 and 3." It's like, "We did register chapters 1, 2, and 3. We registered it with the book. We registered it with all the code. You have a subset of the code."

So we've explained that to them over and over.

They won't tell you that part. They just keep saying,

"You said it wasn't registered." We never said that.

It's registered as a part of the whole.

So it's definitely registered, as Mr. Ashley

said. They will see that. They already have, you know, the copy that they have. So I really don't think that's an issue and we should proceed.

I don't know if we want to move on to the SNMP Research software. I guess we still need to set a date for the production.

THE COURT: Yes. So, Ms. Plessman, can you make the -- so this would be my thought: There would be 20 days for the exchange of the copyright. So at the same time, it would be for the source code of the products listed in the Complaint during that time frame. And then we'll set a deadline for the subsequent versions.

MS. PLESSMAN: And just so I understand, because, again, just going back to the -- when we talk about products, what we are talking about, really, is the operating system, which would be consistent across all products. So the products listed in the Complaint and in Interrogatory 1 when we're talking about the --

THE COURT: So I'm looking at --

MS. PLESSMAN: -- operating system.

THE COURT: I'm looking at paragraph 64, which are the -- in the Complaint, which appears to be the claimed product families.

MR. WOOD: Yes. And I think we can agree with

Ms. Plessman. So what they call their -- they call their software operating system, I think it's really the software that runs on a Linux operating system, probably embedded. And to the extent they use the same software in every product, they would just need -- I mean, that would be one production. They just need to represent that to us.

So if they say this is the software version and it runs on all of these products, then we're not expecting them to produce the exact same thing, you know, 15 times.

But it's however they do -- if it's different for every product, we want to get the different version for every product. We don't actually know. But I think what she is saying, and it may be the same -- and I think it's the same for Extreme. And if that's the case, it's really not an obscene burden to produce it if it's -- if they're using shared code, which most -- you know, most companies do that. It's just efficient.

THE COURT: Ms. Plessman, can you do that, just represent if it's on -- if it's the same product on various platforms?

MS. PLESSMAN: Yeah, I think we can make a representation of something like that, and I think that makes a lot of sense so that we don't just have to

produce a bunch of the same stuff. But I still have the concern because we're talking about the operating system and the SNMP portion is a -- very easily isolated, what I would propose is that we can extract the SNMP portion relatively quickly. It's in files. They know this. It's not -- it's not mixed in with the rest of the code. It's something that we can just pull out of the operating system. They will know the versions. They will know the dates. So I think, certainly, it's a first step, and especially if they want to move things along, that seems like the best way to do it.

THE COURT: What is the issue with that, Mr. Wood?

MR. WOOD: Yeah. Well, Your Honor, we don't know that. We don't know -- I mean, we haven't seen their source code. We don't know how they integrated it into the product. Maybe they kept a lot of it separate.

There are almost always extensive modifications in order to fit it into their product. So without going into too much detail, every -- one of the reasons you have source code is they have to -- so their product has specific values, like temperature. Well, that sensor, they have to integrate whatever reads that with the SNMP code so then you can monitor the temperature of the box. Well, there are thousands of those.

So there is integration that goes on with SNMP. We don't know what they have done. And they may have replaced our code with open source code. We won't know until we see it. They may have partially replaced our code with open source code. That's why we want to see all the versions.

If they did and there is nothing there, well, then, we won't have any claim for those versions. But we don't want to take their representation that, "Oh, it no longer exists. You don't get to see it," because it did exist. When did they actually take it out? Did they take all of it out? Where is it in there?

We can't have them picking and choosing what we see and say, "Oh, it's only this little piece," and then we go, "Well, we think you left this out." "Oh, we didn't use that." "Well, you had to use that or it didn't work." "Well, we didn't use it." And, again, we just need to see the whole thing.

And, again, they haven't presented anything that says there is a burden for them to do that. You don't have anything before you that represents that.

Neither Extreme or Brocade has done that. And if it really was a burden, why didn't they submit that?

THE COURT: Ms. Plessman, can you come up just so we can make sure you're heard?

I'm sorry, Ms. Plessman. I need to consult something to help another judge. Just a minute.

Sorry, Ms. Plessman. Go ahead.

MS. PLESSMAN: Oh, no problem. I was going to say, I was a bit surprised by what I just heard from Mr. Wood because he was actually the one that told me when we were originally negotiating source code protocol and we were kind of questioning the difficulties that it should be no problem because the SNMP portion of the operating system is in separate, easily-isolated folders. So that initially came from Mr. Wood. So what he's saying now is a little bit surprising to me, and I think he knows that that's just not the case.

And what I would say, though, is that we've never said that the -- we will never produce the entire operating code if it becomes apparent that that's necessary. What we've said is that because we have these serious concerns -- and I know they say they didn't make that admission. We disagree. But they've also said that that can be readily determined. It can be quick. That very first stage, we think, before -- it's not about burden. It will be a lot of work, but --

THE COURT: We're just past that --

MS. PLESSMAN: Yeah.

1 THE COURT: -- because they're going to turn 2 over their copyright information --3 MS. PLESSMAN: Right. 4 THE COURT: -- and they have represented there 5 is no problem with that. So we need to get past that. 6 MS. PLESSMAN: So what I'm saying is: As the 7 first step, while we have that initial comparison, we 8 think it makes sense to just pull the SNMP portions. 9 Again, this is a tiny fraction of the overall operating 10 system because what we're talking about here is 11 Brocade's operating system. 12 THE COURT: And is that going to track 13 everything that is needed as the -- with the parameters 14 being everything set forth in paragraph 64 of the 15 Complaint? 16 MS. PLESSMAN: We believe it will show 17 everything that the -- the SNMP code that was included 18 in the operating system is what we are saying we'll 19 provide. 20 THE COURT: And what might that exclude, Mr. Wood --21 22 MR. WOOD: Well --23 THE COURT: -- if she is saying that she is 24 going to supply everything from the SNMP? 25 MR. WOOD: So we've been hearing arguments for

over a year that they don't know what SNMP Research software is; our definitions are confusing; they can't figure it out, and now they're able to identify exactly what it is and they're able to exactly pull it out and it's very easy to do.

So we just -- it's exactly -- Brocade argued exactly the opposite in the A10 case, which is, you can't let the defendants determine what they produce in a copying case.

We need to see it and we get to determine if it's our code or not. We can't have them -- I mean, the problem is they may only give us a small subset.

So, like I said, we have not seen their code.

We haven't seen how it's integrated. So if Ms. Plessman knows it's separate, it could be separate. I don't know. I know there is an integration work they have to do. I just don't know -- I just don't know what they have done because we haven't seen it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WOOD: And, like I said, they haven't submitted any burden --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WOOD: -- for producing it. And I think she was saying it's shared code across multiple products which makes it even less of a burden to produce.

MS. PLESSMAN: I would just point out, the A10 case is a very different case. Again, we're talking about copying versus this is an isolated -- they know exactly what their code looks like, and they will know when they see what we produce that that is the code.

This is a --

THE COURT: Ms. Plessman, I don't want to get to the point where I say, "Okay. Produce those files, just SNMP," and then you say, "Oh, there is a problem with the definition," because I don't want to have to sit here another hour or so and we come up with a definition as well. I don't even think that should be necessary. Like, you know what you have. You're telling me.

MS. PLESSMAN: I think that's a very different issue because what we've always said is that for Brocade, we can provide what SNMP provided to us and we know what -- for Brocade what is in the system and has been in -- for SNMP what is in the system.

When we're talking about the SNMP Research software definition, we're talking about as it's applied across 150 entities and knowing what they may or may not have and all the different iterations.

And so we've just simply said it should be what's provided to us under the license agreement, which

would be what we would be providing in this exchange, you know, as it's integrated into the operating system or registered in the Complaint.

So those are two -- those are two different issues. We wouldn't argue that we can't identify the SNMP software in the operating system. It's just -- and I think they know this. It's an isolated file that is for SNMP.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Neukom, did you have something to add?

MR. NEUKOM: Two brief -- well, I don't know if they will add, but I'll try. Two brief notes.

Number one, I think there has been a confusion about what the defendants' messaging here has been. The point has never been that SNMP Research software was an unfathomable term. The point was in an adversarial proceeding, we need specificity, especially when we're being asked to make a production with representations.

So the idea that on a Brocade/Broadcom side or on the Extreme side that we are able to isolate a folder in a file folder that is associated with SNMP is in no fashion inconsistent with defendants properly saying, "Your definition of SNMP Research software is unworkably broad."

You know, I don't know if the Court remembers

this, but -- because it was now two hours ago, but I think it was Mr. Ashley or maybe Mr. Wood at one point read for this Court what the discovery instrument definition of that was.

I hope the Court was paying careful attention to bucket three, which was -- and I'm paraphrasing -- anything that SNMP ever created. That goes back to the boring scenario of me and Ms. Demers working hard and not understanding how we can make a certification.

My second point is: Maybe I had misunderstood this, but I think that we've been talking about, functionally speaking, the definition of SNMP Research software the whole time. I mean, the whole point of the definition of that term is to try to get us to some sort of greased-wheels position on discovery.

So if the Court would like to have further colloquy with all of us about how we want to define that term, we are, of course, at the pleasure of the Court.

By the way, we've moved back all of our travel. So we're with you for as long as you'd like us today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NEUKOM: But I'm not sure there is much utility to that, to having, like, a separate -- it would almost feel to me like a philosophy debate.

If what we agree upon today is -- and I'm not

going to try to restate or shade in my favor, but this simultaneous exchange scenario we've just described, I respectfully submit for purposes of interpreting SNMP Research software and for most other discovery disputes, that is a huge amount of progress and it gets us moving over the next month. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ASHLEY: Your Honor, if I could just say a couple quick words. I started this day, and I do think that if we keep our eye on the ball right now, which is the products alleged in the Complaint, their actual accused products in the Complaint, we delineated them. We have a basis for it. We're asking for the code in those products, all the way up from 2017 to the present day. They have it. They should have nothing to hide if they didn't copy. We've always offered to say, in exchange, we'll do a simultaneous exchange of our code.

What you're hearing is, "Well, there might be some extra code that you don't need." Compare that with the fate we suffer if they control what we get to see.

It's not privileged material. It's not attorney work product. They're saying it's just extraneous code that we don't need to see. That's why we have a protective order with very detailed provisions protecting source code. So that just means we have more

review to do. And if they really had a burdensome argument, they would have made it.

Mr. Neukom indicated he can do this in 40 days. We could do it in 40 days, too. We can do a simultaneous exchange. But you could also order it earlier. I think they could do that. But it should be the full code in the products.

And if there is extraneous codes that the parties don't need to look at or that's ultimately not used in the case, no harm. But that contrary, which is if you give them control of what they show us because of what internal folder they look at for the very products they already admitted pre-suit they needed a license for -- I read you the language, but they didn't have one -- you're giving the fox control of the henhouse. And there is no justification for that under the broad definition of relevance and when they haven't put in any affidavit of burden.

So I suggest that you do what you originally indicated, which is a simultaneous exchange on a date certain. We give them the code at the Copyright Office and they give us the code for all of the accused products in the Complaint from January 1st, 2017 to the present. And then we can define SNMP software for what else they search for.

But those -- those allegations in the Complaint on those particular accused products should not be a debate. They will have their defenses, but we can debate SNMP Research software and how to define it.

I would suggest that we keep what we have in the current discovery. And then what I've suggested to both Broadcom and Brocade and to Extreme is: You heard complaints that they don't know if SNMP has some subsidiary, you know, in Venezuela. Well, we don't. And I said we can use the definition to include only the two named plaintiffs when they're searching for our software, and then the exact same litany of ones where they say agents, attorneys, etcetera, that they use to define our client in their own discovery. So that should take care of that problem.

We said we'd carve out any contracts they have. So if they have other legitimate contracts to SNMP software, we'll carve it out, and that should take care of the issues that they're complaining about.

Everything else they're complaining about is: They don't know if the case is that good; they want to do a copyright analysis. They should not be doing a merits legal analysis to tell us which software of ours is in their products.

But that's another day. I agree with

Mr. Neukom. If we can leave today with this simultaneous exchange of source code on a date certain but for all the products in the Complaint, I think we've gotten a lot done today.

Your Honor, I would also -- my colleagues tell me we would also like -- just because of the impending deadlines -- the Court to order a date certain for them to produce whatever else you order ultimately, in terms of all the other objections and all the other requests.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ASHLEY: Including the ones that they say they're just working on or they want a further meet and confer. We think we're so far past that point.

THE COURT: Yes, I'll take it under advisement for the rest of that. I just want to, today, get things moving in the interim.

MR. ASHLEY: One thing that I didn't -- that we haven't clarified is that we want the build environment as well with the source code. I mean, it's going to be in the same location. They have indicated no burden to produce that.

THE COURT: Let me ask this: I heard that that may -- it sounded to me like it would be unnecessary for the build environment if you had the full source code.

MR. ASHLEY: Yeah. Well, like I said earlier,

when they produce the source code --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ASHLEY: -- you heard it could be a single big source code that covers all the products, and when they produce that source code and then we analyze it for copying, they can later allege that we haven't met our burden of proof because we haven't shown that the source code, that particular portion of the source code, actually made it into the product. In the build environment is how you determine which portion of the source code actually makes it into the final product.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PLESSMAN: Your Honor, may I address --

MR. ASHLEY: Okay. I should have also said you need the build environment and the install images to do that. Nobody has even contended it would be difficult to produce the install images. They're literally sent to the customer with the product.

THE COURT: I recall that. Thank you.

MS. PLESSMAN: Can I just address that?

THE COURT: Please come to the podium.

MS. PLESSMAN: With respect to the build environment and the install images, this is something that has barely been discussed in any of the meet and confers. We've heard hardly anything about why it's

necessary except for today. I think there is a paragraph in the Motion to Compel. It actually is a very big deal and it's completely unnecessary.

So what I would submit is: Let's do a source code exchange, and if we need the build environment or the install images, I mean, my understanding is that it is many, many gigabits of data and it's not necessary given the type of product that we're talking about and the SNMP protocol at issue. It's just not. It's not necessary, and I think it will really slow things down and it will be very time-consuming.

So what I would suggest is that the parties meet and confer about that and what they really need, and if there is a way to narrow that, so if there is a sampling or something, or representations about what was included in the products rather than actually going through the process of producing the build environments, I think, would be a better process.

And then one other -- to the extent that you are planning on issuing an order on the -- you know, the other remaining document requests, I would just say, again, we -- the starting point is the definitions. It doesn't mean that after we settle the definitions and get -- and narrow the request in that way that they're not still problematic. And I would say one particular

area has to do with the financial documents. And I think I pointed that out.

But I just don't want to see an order that would be kind of disastrous and way overbroad. So I just wanted to raise that. You know, that's where they're seeking all documents related to all financial documents for a time period that they are not even saying was infringing, and it's just way overbroad. And what we have agreed to provide are documents sufficient to show the revenues, the profits, the costs, but not all documents relating to --

THE COURT: That's what I'm going to find is the problem if you didn't provide a date when you're going to do that. That's going to be problematic.

MS. PLESSMAN: For the documents sufficient to show?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. PLESSMAN: I think we can do that within 30 days. I just -- you know, if we're talking about all documents relating to any financial documents, that's a much bigger burden.

THE COURT: I'll go back and see what your written response was.

MR. ASHLEY: Your Honor, on the build environment and the install images, their main briefing

originally was, "We don't know what it means. It's vague and ambiguous." They know what it means. Every engineer should have a build environment to do their job, and what you're still hearing now is argument from counsel on something they should have submitted an affidavit for or evidence for.

We don't have very much time. All you keep hearing from them is a preliminary step. They gave egregiously improper responses. They have -- they have run the clock out as far as they can. And they're still not giving you evidence that any of this is a burden or they can't do it.

This is Broadcom. And Extreme may be smaller, but they're still a huge company. And this product line, they're not saying -- for all we know, it could be a download that takes a day.

They're not -- they haven't given you any information at all on that, and that was their obligation, and they knew it was their obligation, and now we're four-and-a-half months from when our reports are due and all you keep hearing from them is a preliminary step. And I think that we've crossed that bridge. They should be ordered to produce the full source code, build environment, and install images for at least the products at issue in the Complaint on a

date certain, and it should be very soon, and then we can talk -- there is still going to be a lot more work to do.

And we haven't even gotten to the point where we can look at it and start doing the work. So I really think their protests about starting off and seeing how it goes and doing some further meet and confers, that we just -- we're past that point. So we would respectfully urge the Court to order the production of those critical items, hopefully within a date certain very soon, and they get to work today.

Because what's going to happen is: They're going to do the source code, and then 30 days later, we'll be fighting about the build environment. And there is -- I think if they wanted to do that, they should have responded differently a long time ago to our discovery.

THE COURT: Mr. Neukom, if I could ask you first. So in talking about the versions, you gave me 40 days for all versions, probably 20 days for just those products in the Complaint. Do we know if it's that -- I mean, if you're looking for all of it, does it not make sense -- would it not be more efficient to do it all at one time?

MR. NEUKOM: So I think the distinction that I

was trying to make was not all products versus those in the Complaint, but, rather, the versions of the product that we received from Broadcom/Brocade versus -- within the 11 product families that they have named in their Complaint versus truing that up over the ensuing five years.

We have a desire how the Court rules. However you rule, we will, of course, abide by it. But the scope -- the scope of work that is to be done for that 2017 set versus a five-year going back is quite different. And I just think it's a matter of volume and time.

If I may, on the same topic, I'm actually a little bit surprised that we're hearing argument today about source code production not being burdensome and also about it sort of being not a big deal; that people should just be producing images and build environments and entire versions. I think if there is one thing that's been clear in IP law in the last 15 years, it's that on the issue when a technology company is asked to make a production of its source code, maybe other than deposing a high-maintenance CEO, it might be the single biggest hot-button topic that arises in these cases.

You've heard from Broadcom/Brocade that they want to very sensitive about what source code they're

going to produce. Extreme has taken the same position.

I will not further tilt at that windmill because I think the Court has heard our thought on that. I do, however, have one other closing point which I hope is a productive one.

I've been disappointed a little bit today to hear a fair amount of mud slinging, and I think that all of us on this side of the courtroom or the court are a little better than that.

I told you, without telling you what they were, that the frustrations during the meet and confer process have been mutual. I did not go down the rabbit hole.

I'm now mixing metaphors to tell you why we have been so frustrated, the inconsistencies, the fools' errands we feel like we've been sent on because I just don't think that's particularly appropriate for officers of the court to be giving to the Court in soap opera.

But I will represent to you this: On the Extreme side, I think on all sides, we have been engaging in this process in good faith. It has been iterative. It has been slow. But it does not mean that anybody is -- insert here -- stonewalling, bad defendant playing gamesmanship. It means that sometimes issues like this are tough. Like, how do you defend a source code copyright case when you don't have the source code

copyright and the plaintiff won't give it to you?

Now, Mr. Ashley or Mr. Wood could give you their own good soundbite to say why they have been so frustrated. But I hope for future hearings we can have a fair fight about what should be produced or not without the name calling, and, for my part, I will certainly try to do that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. I'm going to take a ten-minute recess. And so we'll -- that will make it 3:00. So we'll recess for ten minutes.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This honorable court stands in recess.

(A brief recess was taken.)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. This court is again in session. Please come to order and be seated.

THE COURT: Okay. After taking everything into consideration, I think the most important takeaway from today is to get the parties started with the discovery.

So in consideration of the general time frames that were outlined, I want to set the date for the simultaneous exchange for April the 22nd, and we'll say noon. That will -- I also want to add, though, that can certainly be before that date if there is mutual agreement, but April the 22nd at noon is the cutoff

date. Well, that's the exact simultaneous exchange time, but if you agree to a day or two before at another exact time, let me know beforehand.

So this will include the plaintiffs producing the eight registered copyright works. There are eight; correct? That's what I heard in argument. Okay.

And then the defendants will produce the source code for all of the alleged infringing products that are set forth in the Complaint. This is going to include 2017 to the present for those products because I -- I acknowledge the arguments that that would take more time, and, Ms. Plessman, I have taken into consideration your representation that the information may encompass more than just SNMP, but I do not have anything before me where I can appropriately measure any arguments as to proportionality in that regard. So, at this point, it's going to encompass those products and the versions from 2017 to the present.

All other issues I'm going to address in an order, and that will include the issue raised regarding the build environment. So I hope just this step with the deadline of April the 22nd at noon can get you started. I hope it will be productive, and we will deal with things as we go along. But I hope with this and the order that I'll get down as soon as possible with

regard to the other matters will get you all well on 2 your way into getting your case ready. 3 So, thank you for your extended time here in 4 the Eastern District today, and I wish you all well in 5 getting your case prepared. 6 MR. ASHLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 MR. NEUKOM: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. PLESSMAN: 8 Thank you. 9 MS. RICE: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Anything else we need to address? 11 No, Your Honor. Thank you. MS. RICE: 12 THE COURT: All right. We'll stand adjourned. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. 13 14 honorable court stands adjourned. 15 (Which were all the proceedings had and 16 herein transcribed.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E2 STATE OF TENNESSEE 3 COUNTY OF KNOX I, Teresa S. Grandchamp, RMR, CRR, do hereby 4 5 certify that I reported in machine shorthand the above 6 proceedings; that the foregoing pages were transcribed 7 under my personal supervision and constitute a true and 8 accurate record of the proceedings. 9 I further certify that I am not an attorney or 10 counsel of any of the parties, nor an employee or 11 relative of any attorney or counsel connected with the 12 action, nor financially interested in the action. 13 Transcript completed and signed on Monday, 14 April the 11th, 2022. 15 16 17 18 20 TERESA S. GRANDCHAMP, RMR, CRR 21 Official Court Reporter 22 23 24 25